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PREFACE

I THINK it is useful and necessary to explain at once the particular point of view from which I describe in this study the life of a community of Greek Sarakatsan shepherds. I begin with an analysis, in some detail, of kinship institutions and the structure of the family, which emphasizes how an individual's moral obligations are concentrated almost exclusively within family and kindred at the expense of his relations with people outside that relatively limited circle. Families not connected by kinship or marriage are related through institutions of mutual hostility and competition; and unrelated persons view one another at all times with intense distrust. A system of social values based on concepts of honour, strength, and pride is associated with these institutions and attitudes, and together they guide the conduct of Sarakatsani in the apparent anarchy of their communal life. Inevitably these institutions and values severely limit the possible forms of economic and civic co-operation. Further, they considerably affect the character of the relations between this community of mutually opposed family commonwealths and the rest of Greek society. Given a centralized administration, and parliamentary government with a universal franchise, an implication of the internal structure of the community is that these relations tend to take certain forms of political and social patronage. Honour, Family, and Patronage represent a pattern of interrelated institutions and values.

In this book I have attempted to abstract for the purposes of analysis a particular complex of institutions and values which are not peculiar to the Sarakatsani. Very similar formal elements are critical for the study of society anywhere in the Greek provinces, and even, in many respects, in the cities. Moreover, the social forms which are described here have many interesting parallels in other parts of the Mediterranean world, and it is principally as a contribution to the study of social structures in this area that I offer my study.

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It follows that this is in no sense a complete ethnographic account of even one community of Sarakatsani, let alone a survey of Sarakatsan culture in general. Mme Chatzimichalis has published the first volume of a work which will represent, when it is completed, the fullest possible account of Sarakatsan folklore and material culture. It is a pleasure to acknowledge my debt to her work which goes far beyond the few references noted in this book. Where there appear to be disagreements between us these are generally accounted for by the circumstance that, as a folklorist, Mme Chatzimichalis' object is to describe Sarakatsan life and culture in its most traditional form. My own study, on the other hand, is concerned with only certain aspects of a particular community of Sarakatsani as I discovered it in 1954 and 1955.

Various incidents in this book describe the illegal acts of some individuals, or the social humiliation of others; and most of the information I received from Sarakatsani was certainly regarded by them as confidential. I have therefore taken what steps I can to cover personal identities. Although I lived among Sarakatsani in a number of villages in Zagori, the greater part of the material used in this study concerns the Sarakatsani who graze the land of one particular village in central Zagori. To this village I have given the fictitious name of Neochori. Similarly I have changed all personal names.

It is impossible, unfortunately, to acknowledge all the many instances of help and hospitality I have received at various times. There are original debts of gratitude to Mr. W. A. Camps who persuaded the Ministry of Education to support my research when they had virtually decided otherwise; and to my father who supplemented this grant at times of crisis to make it barely possible to carry out the necessary fieldwork. At an early moment of indecision in Greece I received a letter from Professor E. E. Evans-Pritchard which advised me to join the Sarakatsani. In retrospect, I owe much to this. I have to thank Dr. J. G. Peristiany for his constant encouragement, and for many discussions which have radically affected the form of this book particularly in connexion with my analysis of Sarakatsan values. My gratitude is due to Dr. J. M. Beattie and Dr. Rodney Needham who read the manuscript and offered many invaluable criticisms and suggestions. I also wish to thank Sir Maurice

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It is believed by the Sarakatsani that the interests of unrelated families are opposed and, indeed, mutually destructive. The local gathering of families which in summer happen to graze the pastures and enjoy citizenship rights of the same village, has little cohesion as a group except when on a rare occasion, such as a village festival, it breaks into brief and violent opposition to the villagers; and it has no organization beyond the ephemeral political combinations which appear at the time of local village elections. The idea of the total community is, of course, important; it represents a way of life in opposition to the ways of peasants, merchants, and bureaucrats. But the community, too, lacks any structure of authority or effective organization; and, in part, for the same reasons, that is to say the solidarity, exclusiveness, and mutual opposition of the families which form it.

While it is true that the total community (or the local gathering of families as a segment of it) is not an organized social group, it nevertheless defines a social space within which values are shared and the conduct of men and women is evaluated by other Sarakatsani. These values concern, especially, right ways of acting in family and kinship roles and the sex-linked moral characteristics which a man or woman ought to exhibit when he, or she, stands forward as the protagonist of the family and the guardian of its honour. Such evaluations imply a hierarchy of prestige. And it is precisely through mutual competition in terms of strength, wealth, and a reputation for honour, that the opposed families, and groups of related families, are associated with one another in a coherent and regular manner.

To these general features of the community it is necessary to add a brief consideration of particular geographical and historical factors which help to explain the presence of the Sarakatsani in the Zagori. Geographically Zagori is the western flank of the Pindus range immediately north of the approaches to the Metsovo pass, which forms its southern boundary; the mountain Mitsikeli is its western limit, and the sweep of the river Aóös contains it from the east and the north. The ridges of the Pindus, which effectively separate the eastern and western coastal plains of continental Greece, run in a north-west to south-east direction. The vast pressures which created these folds came from the east so that the escarpments present extremely abrupt

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XI

THE VALUES OF RELIGIOUS BELIEF

1. GOD AND SIN

I DO not propose to discuss in any detail the ritual practices of Sarakatsan religious life, nor the peripheral complex of magic techniques which are sometimes linked to religious beliefs and sometimes not. My purpose is to indicate the general character of Sarakatsan religious conceptions and to show in what way a form of Christian belief may co-exist with the values of honour and prestige that were examined in the previous chapter.

In certain respects the relationship of the Sarakatsani to the Greek Orthodox Church, as an institution, is tenuous. They have never been regular churchgoers. Before 1938 their huts were often far from villages and few adult men and women would have been able to escape from the imperative routines of family and flocks to make the long journey over difficult country. And since they have come to live in or near the villages, the almost open ridicule and contempt of the villagers have discouraged the Sarakatsani from altering this traditional pattern.

When a Sarakatsanos goes to church he normally does so with the intention of taking Holy Communion, and this he ought to do, preferably, twice a year. During Easter week almost every man, woman, and child in the community will find a means of attending one of the services, and the majority will discover an opportunity to communicate again later in the year on the feast day of the Assumption of the All Holy Mother of God on 15th August, or at Christmas, or at one of the other more important festivals of the Church.

The Eucharist, in the simple way that they understand it as the sacrifice of Christ's blood which overcomes the barrier of sin separating man from God, is the central belief of Sarakatsan religious life. Otherwise, when they attend a service they understand nothing of the structure of the liturgy, they do not know that the liturgy is a symbolic representation of the life and sacrifice of Christ. Only the shorter and more frequently

000/i/ Work published in cooperation with the National Center of Scientific Research

NOMADIC SHEPHERDS OF THE MEDITERRANEAN

The Sarakatsani of Greece

/ii/ Applied Sciences of Humankind Series, Paul Albou, Director

/iii/

Georges B. Kavadias

NOMADIC SHEPHERDS OF THE MEDITERRANEAN

The Sarakatsani of Greece

Photographs and drawings by the author

Paris

Gauthier-Villars

1965

128 /iv/ A detailed bibliography will be found at the end of the present work. We beg the reader kindly to refer to it, the bibliographical information given in the footnotes being in abbreviated form.

000 /v/ To the sacred memory of my father

To my mother

/vi/ /blank/

/vii/

Foreword

121 The work of Georges Kavadias, which we present to the public today, is the first in a series that will be devoted to the Applied Sciences of Humankind. This may astonish some who consider the sciences of Humankind and sociology to be identical in their basis and in their application. Our point of view is different: for us, the sciences of humankind cannot be founded only on the traditional social sciences; they most certainly include these but they must extend beyond them while enriching them. They endeavor to grasp, by a multidisciplinary approach, the complexity of reality, hence the contradictions which are resolved in practice. Originating from diverse epistemological or methodological considerations, these contradictions--which show the dialectical character of the human phenomenon--are, paradoxically but emphatically, the basis of a global interpretation which alone is capable of guiding the specialist,

/vii cont./

121 whether investigator or practitioner. By an applied science of humankind we mean, actually, not the exploitation of knowledge, which would give rise to procedures and tricks, but rather the increase of this knowledge (hence of our power) by the application of the most rigorous scientific methods to the solution of concrete problems of economic and social life Now, what is more concrete than the monograph by Georges Kavadias? Is anything more applied--in the sense we have just pointed out? In this essay, which has yielded its author very flattering distinctions, the sociologist and economist, the psychologist and specialist in technical assistance, the ethnologist and jurist--the administrator and the scholar--will find material for profitable reflection. Professor Leroi-Gourhan shows, below, the interest of this work. We will confine ourselves to pointing out the importance of the transformation which the sciences of humankind have undergone today--where theory no longer disavows the practice that gave rise to it and illuminates it while perfecting. The fine work of Georges Kavadias illustrates perfectly this new orientation.

Paul Albou.

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/ix/

Preface

Man has never grown tired of contemplating his image, has never lost his suriosity for his own past. The prehistorian, the archaeologist, the ethnologist, of the present century, are only the instruments of this eagerness to know, the scientific mutations, in the age of the exact sciences, of the travelers and epic narrators of old. Curiosity perhaps, but perhaps necessity as vital as that of light and warmth; for if techniques require only agents, the civilization which invents techniques

/1x cont./

121 cannot do without knowing what it is. That is the prime motive of the sciences of humankind and it amply justifies their existence.

To study in detail the situation of a category of human beings who are in the process of disappearing can serve the noble purpose of helping them in their distress, of inducing society to help them survive or die more tranquilly. This is a pious illusion, for social 121 progress wipes out cultures without shedding the blood of individuals: 199 one generation will perchance regret, the second will adapt itself, the 198 third has forgotten. Better cared for, better fed, better housed, the grandchildren of the last Sarakatsani shepherds, having become good servants of modern economy, will feed their imagination, like everybody else, on the pastoral adventures of a fictitious people, the cowboys of the Far West, the universal symbol of freedom in herding. Unless folklore is born from the ashes of Greek pastoral life, and unless in a century, thanks to this book, the adventures of the wild Thessalian nomads will be restored to the descendants of shepherds. In any case, we come back to the fact that humanity will have maintained its indispensable image of itself.

121 One could conceive of a third angle of vision, from which, assuming the principle that diversity of methods of production could lead to an economy less reckless in its consumption, one could imagine a veritable transposition from the archaic pastoral nomad to a modern pastoral nomad. It is here that an in-depth study without an apparent practical aim could, in the future, actually serve a /x/ concrete purpose. Every society that endures in a certain way of life performs an experiment the evidence of which cannot be useless. The general laws of equilibrium of human groups have been scarcely glimpsed. The subtle interplay of technical, economic, social, religious, esthetic values gives the feeling of actually being an individual within a community, hence of a truly significant unit. This interplay is discerned by sociologists, but its rules are only on the verge of being analyzed. To reason coldly, it matters very little whether an economy of a type

/x cont./

[12] that is passing completes its ruin in its last representatives, but it is essential for society that their experience be recorded, for in ten years or in a hundred all that will remain will be an aspect of human consciousness masked but not obliterated by modern life, lacking any evidence other than that gathered by ethnology.

To reason coldly is, furthermore, not characteristic of ethnology which must experience its evidence directly: life is inseparable from affective warmth when one works with human material. Georges Kavadias has lived his experience of the Sarakatsani with his heart and with his intelligence, each in turn becoming the servant of the other. Having [114] seen him, with his wife, in the field, I know what passionate solicitude he brought to the research, and I know all that the present book represents in years of direct collecting followed by those of formulation. About this strange world of transhumant shepherds of Balkan and Hellenic Europe we had only data that were fragmentary and relatively inaccessible. It is the first time that a work on this subject appears in a perspective which includes all the spheres of life and their relationships. May it fulfill the role which its author hoped for it: to be at once a homage to the world of the Sarakatsani and an element in the construction of a true image of man.

André Leroi-Gourhan,
Professor at the Sorbonne.

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/1/ Introduction

121 178 Nomadic Shepherds of the Mediteranean--the Sarakatsani of Greece: the title already announces the content of this work; the study of one of the forms of traditional life that are decreasing rapidly in the Mediterranean countries, under the influence of what we commonly call "progress."

121 This work, undertaken several years ago, comes under the heading of contemporary social-cultural anthropology and is defined within its framework.

However, since the scope and point of view of this discipline are still the object of epistemological controversies, it will be advisable to answer two fundamental questions: What are the problems relevant to anthropology? And, consequently, what is the precise orientation of this work?

In order to answer them we should recall the discussion of the function of anthropology already begun in the early part of the century, succinctly summarized in the contribution of G. Balandier to Traité de Sociologie, published under the editorship of G. Gurvitch. (1)

[113] 1. See G. Gurvitch: Traité de Sociologie vol. I, chat. v. "Sociologie, Ethnologie et Ethnographie", by G. Balandier, p. 99-115 and bibliographic citations.

It is well known that the teachings of British and American schools of anthropology represent the chief poles of divergence. The first is oriented more towards the study of social relations and structures, while the second is directed more towards culture, the ideological and material assets of societies. (2)

[113] 2. See, for example, the works of A.R. Radcliffe-Brown: Structure and Function in Primitive Society and A.L. Kroeber (ed.): Anthropology Today /both titles cited in English/, representatives of the divergence: as well as the controversy between G.P. Murdock and R. Firth in: American Anthropologist, vol. 53, no. 4, 1951, cited by G. Balandier, ibid.

/1 cont./

[12] Nevertheless, these two positions do not seem incompatible. According to a very discerning statement by C. Lévi-Strauss: "because anthropology calls itself social or cultural it aspires always to know the total man, seen, in one case through /2/ his productions, and in the other, through his representations." (3)

[13] 3. See C. Lévi-Strauss: Place de l'Anthropologie dans les Sciences Sociales et problèmes póses par son enseignement, in Sciences Sociales, etc., published by UNESCO, p. 113.

In any case, let us add, and this represents our position, it aspires to know man "in context"; hence to deepen the knowledge of man as such--his reactions and his collective productions as well as his cultural works, likewise collective--man in his universe, both natural and human--given, modified or created by him--and struggling to fulfill his life.

This "synthetic" position, is inspired by the teaching of Marcel Mauss--which, from all evidence, likewise inspired C. Lévi-Strauss (4)--

4. See C. Lévi-Strauss: Introduction à l'oeuvre de Mauss, p. XXV ff.

but it is not based on the authority of the master, nor yet on an "interdisciplinary" ecclecticism, which would be absurd. Our decision to approach the problem in a multidimensional manner arises from the very nature of things. Granted that the social and the cultural are inextricably and to a very large extent interlocked, it is obvious that if one does not wish to confine oneself to a sterile nominalism and to leave obscure extremely important aspects, one is obliged to study both together, and to bring to light both their specific characteristics and their mutual relationships. This is the only way to achieve our aim, /namely/ the knowledge of the total Sarakatsani man.

However, a question still remains to be discussed. Can a monographic study such as ours expect to be accepted within the framework of anthropology which aims, according to G. Balandier, to elucidate the general

/2 cont./
properties characterizing the life of man in society? (5)

5. Ibid., p. 102

Or should it, rather, be content with a more modest ambition, that of all ethnographic monographs, to describe more than to explain? In other words, starting from a particular case, can one hope to touch the general?

We believe that, all things considered, we may reply in the affirmative. If the descriptive work proper to every monograph is accompanied by certain comparative statements and if, moreover and above all, it is followed by an explanatory essay, certainly its conclusions will be considered to have anthropological value. /3/ Not because they reveal the universal "socius," but a partial socious, entitled to be integrated with the former and to contribute to its elucidation. Let us remember that if general anthropology has not yet advanced a great deal it is because explanatory monographs are relatively few in number. It seems to us that between the traditional ethnographic monograph and that of inspired by anthropology there is a very obvious gap which justifies a separate category for the latter. The present investigation therefore aspires to take its place among these works.

However, a final aspect which forms of our reflections on our general position ought to be explained: what is culture?

As far as we know, none of the definitions of culture proposed by the different sciences of man can be considered as generally accepted. The following works provide eloquent illustrations. First, Civilisation-le mot et l'idée, published by the Centre international de synthèse (Première semaine internationale de synthèse--II Fsc.), Paris, la Renaissance du Livre, 1930; and second, A.L. Kroeber and Cl. Kluckohn[sic!]: Culture, a critical review of concepts and definitions /cited in English/, Cambridge University Press, 1952.

Obviously, we do not propose to recommence the discussion. Such a task goes far beyond the scope of this work. Nevertheless, the necessity of delimiting our subject, of justifying our plan and explaining the

/3 cont./
121 orientation of the analyses we are going to undertake, requires us to take a stand, even briefly, and to say what we ourselves mean by the term culture.

All creations merit the term culture which are relevant to man's constant effort to conquer all the obstacles he comes up against in the process of ceaselessly adjusting to the conditions imposed upon by his natural and social environment.

In other words, culture is merely the "composite of solutions and responses" that man puts forth in order to satisfy his material, psychological, spiritual, and social needs as these are formed by the concrete conditions of his existence. This composite varies according to societies and different periods of life of the latter; it is transmitted traditionally by custom and enriched by innovations and creations which are ceaselessly added to it.

It will be agreed, we hope, that this definition which /4/ is partly inspired by contemporary anthropology (6)

[113] 6. See: M.J. Herskovits: Man and his Works p.154; A.L.Kroeber: Anthropology p.8-9; B. Malinowski: A Scientific Theory of Culture, Chapel Hill, North Carolina, 1944, p. 36; F. Boas: "Anthropology," in Encyclopedia of Social Sciences, vol. 2, New York 1930, p. 79; C. Lévi-Strauss: Anthropologie Structurale Paris 1958, p.390, etc.

is free from all philosophical or other bias and yet does not distort reality. It seems, therefore, to have all the qualities necessary for the guiding thread of our investigation.

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121 182 Placed in a pre-determined environment, the Sarakatsani, like any other human being, must apply his ingenuity to the solution of his vital problems in a manner peculiar to him, and in that manner we can recognize the originality of his way of life.

Thus, if the present work is conducted from an anthropological

/4 cont./
121 182 perspective it must first of all be concerned with this originality and try to isolate it and bring it out. To achieve this it is important to specify clearly:

1. The concrete problems which the Sarakatsani must face.

2. The conditions and possibilities which his natural and human environment impose on him and offer him for the solution of these problems.

3. Finally, and above all, the system of actual solutions which the Sarakatsani has developed in relation to the two preceding points, hence the socio-cultural system of Sarakatsani society.

This last point will furnish an answer to the question posed above. Moreover, it will form the basis of our conclusions with regard to our knowledge of the Sarakatsani from their works.

To pass from the general to the particular, the problems the Sarakatsani faces are:

--Control of nature and the biological environment (plants, animals) for utilitarian ends.

--The relations of the Sarakatsani with his fellow man and with surrounding society, for the following purposes:

--a complete enjoyment of natural resources,

--a harmonious and effective coexistence,

--a way of life guaranteeing to all subsistence, security and posterity.

/5/ --His relations with the great beyond.

--Finally, problems relating to the esthetic of the Sarakatsani and his sense of beauty.

It will be seen that these problems, common to all societies, are in no way peculiar to him.

[36] [22] On the other hand, the conditions in which they must be resolved are altogether specific and derive from the fact that as shepherds the Sarakatsani live outside all urban or rural centers, spending the summer in the mountains, in winter in the valleys, according to the needs of their flocks.

/5 cont./

121 182 361 It is clear, therefore, that the fundamental parameters of their existence are the herding of small livestock; the seasonal displacement in the form of nomadism; the fact that they are situated in inhabited regions; their isolation from the surrounding society; the maintainance with that society of a minimum of necessary relations connected largely with their activity as shepherds; the physico-chemical nature of the soil and the terrain, the climate, the flora and fauna, characteristics of the Hellenic Peninsula that is their habitat.

121 182 194 This is not all. Sarakatsani society seems to have its origins in Hellenic society. Many aspects of its culture are found to be inspired by very ancient Hellenic culture. Now this fact constitutes another very important parameter, a temporal dimension that is not negligible and that we should constantly keep in mind as much as the others, all during our investigation. This aspect should figure, and will actually figure in our analysis.

However, since the question of the ethnic origins of the Sarakatsani has been disputed, it is advisable to devote a few pages to it, if only to justify what we have just said.

***

174 Since the evidence and the objective data concerning the origin of the Sarakatsani are sadly lacking, the way is open for theoretical discussion.

A considerable number of historians, geographers, linguists, literary men, etc., Greeks and outsiders, have advanced widely divergent hypotheses, presenting the Sarakatsani by turns as Turks, Italiotes, Rumanians, Arumani, direct descendants of the Greek nomads of antiquity, etc.

/6/ A succinct account of their theories will give an idea of these hypotheses.

(113) Authors who maintain that the Sarakatsani are not Greek:

a) The Frenchman, A. van Gennep (7),

/10 cont./
century by Eustace, Bishop of Salonika entitled "Folklore" (Ta Laographika), edited and annotated by Professor F. Koukoulès (in two volumes, Athens, publication of the Society of Macedonian Studies, 1950)--can be of no use for lack of details.

The same is true of the other work of Professor F. Koukoulès: Vie et Civilisation Byzantines (Vol. I-VI, published in Greek in the Collection of the French Institute of Athens, 1947-1957) for although it includes a wealth of details, it gives information only about urban life.

Thus, the arguments presented above permit us to conclude that the Sarakatsani constitute neither an ethnic minority nor a special race, but a part of the Hellenic population, which is distinguishable from the others by the originality of its life-style.

***

This digression ended, we should like to say that the preceding findings, bearing on the special problems which the Sarakatsani must solve and on the conditions under which these problems must find their solution, have already presented the framework for the present work. As far as our conclusions are concerned, we shall attempt, in an essay of synthesis and explanation, to show the broad principles on which Sarakatsani society and culture are based and to try to examine them from a dynamic perspective, that of the process of their formation and of /11/ the function that has been imparted to them. We shall likewise examine, from the same point of view, the constituent elements of the society and culture of the Sarakatsani and their mutual relationships. Finally, we shall concern ourselves with the character of the culture and the human type corresponding to their socio-cultural system, and we shall close on some findings about the reasons for their [sic] decline.

It remains for us only to present, in a few words, the method and techniques used in carrying out the present work.

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114 /13 cont./

[113] 46. P. Sorokin: Les théories Sociologiques..., p. 17. /English taken from the original text in P. Sorokin, Contemporary Sociological Theories, New York; Harper, 1928. p. xxiii/

127 As far as we are concerned, we have used the bibliography
128 mentioned in order to: 1) To present certain phenomena formerly existing that has disappeared at the time of our inquiry; /14/ 2) complete the gaps in our own inquiry; and 3) present interpretations which certain authors have set forth about some phenomena, and, occasionally, to discuss the differences between their point of view and our own. All these cases have been specifically indicated in our text.

128 On the other hand, as far as the descriptions are concerned, we do not cite the authors whose observations coincide with ours. That is [114] because, once in the field, we worked as though nothing had been written on the Sarakatsani; we wanted to form an idea about them which was absolutely our own and study their life thoroughly in order to be able to explain it afterwards. Thus, our text was written from the material that we ourselves collected, with the exception of the cases mentioned above.

[120] Perhaps it should also be added that all the works cited are [121] either descriptive or centered on linguistic analysis. Hence our own contribution consists of the "anthropological" study of the Sarakatsani which, as far as we know, has never been done till now.

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ooo To conclude this introduction we wish to thank all those who directly or indirectly facilitated our task: The old Sarakatsani chiefs N. Tzoumanis, A. Katsoulas, J. Yannakis, P. Karaïskow and the teacher of Tchépélovo, E. Yannakos. Our friends, B. Koutsoumbas and G. Katsambékis, likewise Sarakatsani. The lawyers of Sarakatsani origin, Chr. Karaïskos and N. Tsiamis. The veterinarian M.A. Constandinidès, Madame Fr. Ioannidès, Monsieur and Madame Saliveros, Monsieur and Madame Clonaris, and many others whom we are not able to mention for lack of space but whom we think of with gratitude. May all these persons

/14 cont./

000 kindly accept here the expression of our thanks.

128 We wish to thank also our colleague, Madame Y. Roux, whose help in the revision of our text has been particularly valuable.

000 Finally, I wish to recall my debt to my wife to whom this work, like all the others, owes so much.

/14a/

PART ONE

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/15/

Dialogue With Nature

121 Placing man in relation to nature, in the Aristotelian sense of « [illegible] » releases a whole world of reciprocal actions and reactions. Multiple phenomena appear which make up, on the one hand, the demographic and ecological base of the entire society and the entire culture, and, on the other hand, that which A. Leroi-Gourhan calls "a layer of objects that constitute the trappings of men", (1)

1. Milieu et techniques, p. 361.

in other words, the technology. All these phenomena originate, as the same author expresses it, "at the point of contact between the exterior environment (the environment pure and simple) and the interior environment". (2)

2. Ibid., p. 361.

that is to say, "an extremely complex solution of mental traditions." (3)

3. Ibid., p. 354.

128 This first part will deal with these phenomena: We shall see the Sarakatsani version of this relationship, the way in which our herders manage to converse with nature.

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Chapter I

The Demographic and Ecological Substratum of Sarakatsani Society and Culture

16
114 One can only regret that a complete analysis of the Sarakatsani demographic phenomena is not possible for lack of statistical data.

16
123 It is nevertheless possible to reconstruct some of these by relying
124 on the statements of our informants, on our personal observations, on
127

/24 cont./

128 The pages that follow will show how Sarakatsani society deals with these problems. From another standpoint, they will illustrate the process of interaction of Saraktsani civilization with its morpho-ecological base. Thus the problem of the integration of this partial aspect with the whole will find its solution.

/25/

Chapter II

The Technology of the Sarakatsani

121 Properly speaking, technology is a psychosomatic process. This process, which asserts itself in a given natural environment and a given social framework (1) presents the following characteristics:

(113) 1. See André Leroi-Gourhan: Milieu et Techniques, pp. 355 and 361.--M. Mauss: Les Techniques et la Technologie, in: Mayerson, L. Febvre, A. Aymard, etc: Le Travail et les Techniques, p. 71-78.--A. Varagnac: L'homme et les techniques pré-machinistes in: J. Cassou, G. Friedmann, C. Durtain, M. Bloch, J. Luc, A. Varagnac, etc.: L'homme, la technique et la nature, p. 54.--M. Bloch: Technique et Évolution sociale, op. cit., p. 30. --J.A. Mauduit: Manuel d'Ethnographie, p. 135.--K. Birket-Smith: Histoire de la Civilisation, French translation p. 74-75.

1. It enables /one/ to dominate and exploit the forces and possibilities offered by nature.

2. Its development is a function of these, on the one hand, and of society on the other hand. The latter determines at one and the same time the needs to be met and the manner of doing so, by accumulating knowledge, beliefs and experience acquired in the course of time, as well as by providing the agents entrusted with various tasks.

And it also asserts itself in creations and inventions.

Thus, in technology, nature and society meet.

In order to study it, one may consider technology as a process of action on inert material for the purpose of manufacturing various

/25 cont./
121 objects. However, one may likewise see it as a process permitting first acquisition, then the consumption, the enjoyment and the use of that which is acquired.

In the first instance, we deal with technology technique in the strict sense, in other words, with industry and construction. In the second instance, we encounter it through man, insofar as he is the beneficiary. (2)

[113] 2. André Leroi-Gourhan: in his work cited and in another: L'homme et la matière, presents these two points of view in a manner that cannot be equalled.

/26/ The combination of these two points of view is not impossible, especially as industry and construction constitute a mode of acquisition. We should say that it is even indispensable, if we wish to avoid the risk of changing this anthropological study into a purely technological essay from which man would be absent.

128 Thus, this chapter will be set forth accordingly. Under a first heading we shall present the Sarakatsani techniques of acquisition. Under a second, those of consumption and utilization. And we shall close with some general observations on the technology of these herders.

121 Obviouly, in speaking of technological activity we immediately
128 raise problems of work and of the economy. Since the study of these questions is only possible in close connection with the study of social and economic organization, we shall speak of them in due time.

***

The Technology of Acquisition

In this domain there are five ways open to the Sarakatsani gathering, manufacture, building, herding, trade. Since the last forms part of their economic system, the first four will be examined here.

222 GATHERING
313 The applicability and importance of this manner of acquisition
824 is limited. The economic goods that the Saracatsan derive directly
312 from nature are:

/26 cont./

222 313 824 312 Wood, insofar as it is the chief material for industry and building; insofar as it is the only fuel for cooking and heating.

Edible plants used for food. It is necessary to add to these the medicinal plants, the basis of traditional therapy.

Grass of the pastures, necessary for the flocks.

Finally, water.

128 /27/ For reasons of synthesis, the details of this process (selection of species, persons charged with this task, etc.) will be examined farther on.

Sarakatsani Crafts

121 The concrete form in which the problem of industries presents itself for the Sarakatsani has of three aspects: raw materials, power sources used, tools.

237 824 The principal raw materials are: wood, wool and skins, hence fibrous and pliant substances of vegetable or animal origin. (3)

3. For our terminology see: A. Leroi-Gourhan, L'homme et la matière, pp. 178, 234 and 235.

325 323 285 One might conclude from the foregoing that the Sarakatsani are ignorant of metals, pottery and basketry. This conclusion is valid only in the last two instances.

323 As a matter of fact, the nomadic life does not permit the maintenance of terra cotta utensils, the fragility of which would be put to a severe test during the travels. Moreover, their manufacture would require more of less stable installations (special ovens, sometimes pottery wheels, sets of tools, etc.), specialized and sedentary personnel who could occupy themselves continually with this, finally a relatively high level of technical knowledge (knowledge of various qualities of clay, of the peculiar properties of heat, etc.). Nothing seems less compatible with Sarakatsani life than such an industry. Furthermore, a certain volume of production would be required to make it profitable, and that, in turn, would require the establishment of means of transportation and considerable commercial relations with the outside. Let us say further that nothing would be less justified than to see

/95 cont./

233 [432] sold to livestock dealers. The sterile ewes are also sold.

With she-goats and kids the procedure is the same.

[232] Moreover, castration of a small number of male animals intended for consumption is also practiced.

/96/ METHODS OF UTILIZATION AND CONSUMPTION

121 Some goods obtained are at times directly usable or consumable without the necessity of supplementary intervention. There are others which must first be submitted either to preparation, improvement or transformation. For still others a few some arrangements suffice.

The concrete study of the different items classified according to corresponding needs will show us what, among the Sarakatsani are the various forms of intervention in question.

342 The Dwelling and the Buildings Intended for the Animals.

The huts described serve, as we have seen, primarily for dwelling. The arrangements made to this end are the following:

352 353 The small wall which protects the interior from rainwater also serves as a shelf /piece of furniture of support/. Household articles and especially blankets and rugs belonging to the family are placed upon it (fig. 62). [513] Piled one on top of another all around the hut and covered by those which are considered the most beautiful in design or color, the blankets are always at the disposal of the occupants and thus become part of the decor of the hut.

The "beds," also described above, which line the wall and finish it off are used chiefly to hold sacks, cooking pots, etc. (fig.63).

354 The fire is always burning in the hut. It is where the family prepare their meals and gather round to eat, warm themselves and sleep.

The smoke escapes to the outside through the boughs and leaves of the roof (fig. 76). It is true that when the fire is kindled the smoke rises and accumulates under the roof before being emitted, so that in practice one does not feel it below a height of 1.50 meters from the ground. And the Sarakatsani say that, on principle, "everybody must be

[Fig. 62 appears on p.91--Analyst]

/97 cont./

352 353 The cradle is customarily placed at the back of the hut to the left.

On the interior walls of the hut and near the entrance are fastened short forks of wood upon which hung clothes, bags, etc. are hung.

(343) The small huts are often used as outbuildings (as storehouses, /98/ for instance). They are then provided with "beds" to hold blankets and food provisions in reserve.

343 342 233 Others are used as shelters for the shepherds who do not go far away from the flocks. During the cold nights of winter a fire is lighted there, directly on the earth and beside the entrance.

343 352 With respect to the "frétzato" abutting the hut, as well as for the "photogoni" that serves as outdoor kitchen, there is nothing to add, except that the former, which is fitted out with "beds," also serves as storehouses.

343 (574) The "tsardhaki," free-standing or integrated into a fretzato, functions as reception room for visitors. Moreover, the members of the family sit and even lie down there, comfortably sheltered from the sun during the summer.

(574) Generally speaking, it is the kitchen, the supplies and the space intended for the reception of visitors which "move outdoors," following a general practice widespread throughout several parts of the world. (22)

22. See A. Leroi-Gourhan: Milieu et Technique, p. 286.

The animal shelters protect the flocks from bad weather and from wolves.

Clothing--Blankets--Rugs.

● 121 The study of clothing, blankets and rugs shows us, on the one hand, how the Sarakatsani succeed in meeting the needs corresponding to these objects; on the other hand, it introduces us to their aesthetics.

(128) Inasmuch as we intend to devote a chapter of the present work to

/98 cont./

121 Sarakatsani art, we shall concern ourselves here with only the
128 first aspect of this problem.

291 In general, one may say that:
[191]

The ancient male costume of the Sarakatsani is almost identical with the national costume of continental Greece (fig. 77).

On the other hand, the costume of the women shows striking peculiarities. The austerity of shapes, colors and decorative motifs is found nowhere else.

513 As for the blankets and rugs, the peculiarities that differentiate
352 them from those produced in other regions of continental Greece relate more to technology than to form and color.

/99/

291
302
171

Fig. 77

272 /119 cont./
415 (small goatskin bottle).

273 c) Wine.

[439] d) Finally, spirits. Bought commercially, the last two are hardly ever drunk except at religious or family festivals and above all when hospitality is offered.

272 --Natural beverages: these are fresh water and milk.

--Infusions: coffee is the drink preferred by the Sarakatsani at any rate in the huts, since tea or chocolate are unknown. In addition, [824] one can enumerate a whole list of infusions made with herbs, flowers and leaves of aromatic shrubs, as for example witch hazel flowers, sage or the various medicinal plants.

272 In the way of "consumption technology" the drinking of liquids, when
273 it is collective (water, wine), requires containers with a narrow opening
415 the "voutseli" (fig. 11)[A] which are passed from hand to hand; for individual consumption, cups made in the native crafts or bought commercially are used.

Light and heat.

354 Figure 64[B] shows the solution of these two problems.

For light the Sarakatsani use an oil lamp provided with a wick, which is obtained commercially.

As for heat, the fire of the hearth is quite sufficient. According to our own experience, though it was snowing outside, within the hut it was so warm that a jacket was unbearable.

Sometimes the fire, if bundles of resinous branches are thrown on it, serves also as the only source of light.

****

● 121 Although with this last paragraph, the description of Sarakatsani technology may be considered concluded, this is not to say that the study of "the technological expression" of this society is entirely exhausted. We ought to have gone on to a detailed and complete analysis of the succession of procedural steps that "homo faber saractsanus" /Sarakatsani man, the maker/ applies in each /120/ craft. This task

[A] /Fig. 11 appears on p.43--Analyst/
[B] /Fig. 64 appears on p.92--Analyst/

/120 cont./

121 could only partially be accomplished, chiefly because these herders make each object they need only once. Thus the observer can follow the making of the latter only occasionally. As a result, there is a gap here, which is all the more regrettable since it does not permit the establishment of the links existing between the chain of procedures in question and the corresponding nucleus in society--a significant aspect of the life of every traditional society.

105 182 177 Nevertheless, some positive and general findings should be formulated:

To begin with, all the technology described which deals with crafts, clothing or food, etc., is southeast European or Euroasian technology. The geographical position of the Hellenic Peninsula, as well as the stages of its history, its contacts over the centuries with the Mediterranean world, on the one hand, and the Asiatic peoples on the other, justify this identification.

105 182 Then, the most salient characteristic of all the technology is their great simplicity. All the crafts analyzed can be practiced by anyone at all, and demand only a minimum of knowledge, experience and skill.

The same holds true for the raw materials and the necessary tools.

105 182 177 [176] To this characteristic another should be added, namely the traditional character of this technology, in the sense that innovations practically never occur. Our own experience taught us that each time we were able to observe variations of technology in the different groups we studied, they were a phenomenon of acculturation. The changes took place through the adoption of models coming from the outside. Of course, the integration of new elements was always accompanied by some adaptation or reinterpretation. (27)

27. On the idea of reinterpretation see: M. J. Herskovits: Les bases de l'anthropologie, p. 259f., as well as the commentaries of R. Bastide: Religions africanes. p. 17.

/121 cont./

105 That the technological expression of Sarakatsani society bears the
182 imprint of its fundamental conditions (pastoral life, nomadism, isolation, possibilities offered by geographic environment, etc.) is sufficiently evident, so there is no necessity to stress it further.

The dialogue between this society and its technology thus results in a true harmony of their respective aspects--a harmony of a definite effectiveness in the structuring of this human environment.

/122/ PART TWO

/123/ THE SOCIAL WORLD

121 KINFOLK, OTHER SARAKATSANI, THE SOCIETY AS A WHOLE

Kinfolk, other Sarakatsani, and their society as a whole constitute new aspects, three fundamental problems which are at the basis of the Sarakatsani social world in the strict sense of the term.

The kin, the other Sarakatsani, their integration into multiple groups, these groups themselves and their mutual inter-relationships, these are the specific sociological aspects of the more general problem of life together, of establishing relationships between people within their ingroup as well as with other people, a problem can find its solution only in the making of effective arrangements.

128 The present section will be devoted to it. We shall study succesively the forms of group life which constitute the core of it. How they come about. How they are organized and how they function, while reciprocally bound to one another. Finally, what kind of life takes place within them and means there are for its control.

121 In concrete terms, we distinguish five units in the social life of the Sarakatsani: the conjugal family, the extended family, the Tséligato, Sarakatsani society, finally, the society that surrounds them. Seen from the outside, they give the impression of a whole made up of concentric circles, with the conjugal family as its nucleus.

This impression is illusory and simplistic. For these units, considered as actual social groups, exerts their dynamic force on several levels and in numerous directions. They therefore develop multiple relationships, interchanges and communications from one to

/123 cont./

121 the other and vice versa, which any geometric figure is powerless to represent.

594 /124/ We use the term "conjugal family" to mean the husband and wife and their non-married offspring. (1)

1. See E. Durkheim: La famille conjugale, p. 2 f.

[114] We prefer this term to that of "elementary family" proposed by Radcliffe-Brown Introduction, p. 6, for, as Durkheim correctly says, ibid., p. 3, the children move away after their marriage, but the paternal family continues to exist limited to the two spouses, who constitute stable element which characterizes it. The term "conjugal" is therefore more true to the facts.

596 The extended family comprises the oldest parental couple and their male descendants married and surrounded by their families. The young [591] girls, as soon as they are married, leave the paternal hearth for the abode of their husband. That is how this type of family is born (2) and how this family becomes a patrilocal family.

2. According to A. Radcliffe-Brown: Introduction, p. 7.

591 However, it may happen, though exceptionally, that the husband of the young woman is the one to settle near his father-in-law.

474 612 596 The Tséligato is primarily a cooperative of an economic order, the nucleus of which consists of an extended family, economically powerful in the sense that it has at its disposal very large flocks (some of them exceed 15,000 heads of livestock). With this family a certain number of less wealthy conjugal families or extended families become associated. The associated families may be related collaterally or affinally to one another or to the principal family. However, it is equally possible that no bond of kinship unites them. In addition, it sometimes happens that shepherds without flocks attach themselves in that capacity to the Tséligato.

619 Sarakatsani society is made up of all the Sarakatsani together,

/139 cont./

593 562 Let us make clear, in addition, that the husband owes his wife protection socially as well as economically.

594 Mutual affection is not excluded. It is sometimes even easily attained. Which is not to say that true psychological exchanges can be established between the spouses. (19)

[113] 19. The same principle was valid during classical antiquity and under the hegemony of Byzantium: see A. Delatte: Le cycéon /?/, passim.--Clément d'Alexandrie: Pédagogie, M.P.G. 2, 10, 3, 12.

As a matter of fact, the Sarakatsani consider it unworthy for the man to be content with the company of his wife, to discuss with her their common problems and to ask her opinion about them. The wife exists only [842] to work and bear children--to bear boys above all. When daughters are born, sadness reigns in the family. On the other hand, when a son comes into the world, his mother presents him with pride to the whole family.

842 Thus we come to a particularly interesting problem, that of descent.

[163] We have already said that the Sarakatsani are prolific.

[789] [844] The study of magic will show us that practices of this order pertaining to childbirth would not be ranked among the most insignificant. It is certain that this problem is of fundamental importance among them.

[121] What we wish to bring out in this section is the social aspect of this problem in the life of our nomads.

848 Let us say, first of all, that what counts especially is the legitimacy of the descendants. The study of Sarakatsani customs is very revealing from this point of view.

It seems that the well-known rule of Roman law, which is followed in very many societies, that is pater est quem nuptiae demonstrant /the father is whoever the marriage bonds indicates/ has no validity here. Something /140/ more is required, as is apparent in a certain number of solemn and social acts having to do with the new household and the newborn child.

593 /144 cont./
594 place reserved to the male sex comes out with striking clarity.
562 Finally, everybody works within the family framework, tasks
593 being divided according to sex. The father, assisted by his son,
594 directs all male work, while the mother, at the head of her daughters,
462 devotes herself to the tasks of her sex. An adult son may express to his father his opinion on questions of a technico-economic nature. And the daughters may do the same with the mother. However, this opinion is never determinant and is not necessarily taken into consideration.

593 /145/ In addition, the men of the family may give advice to the
594 women, while keeping aloof from performing work reserved to the latter.
562 On the other hand, the women never interfere in the work of the men,
462 either physically or simply to give their opinion.

121 The regime and the economic activity as well as the work will
596 be reexamined in more detail within the context of the extended family
(594) into which the conjugal family is integrated. For it is in this context that we can observe these problems in depth and in all their real and significant dimensions, since in the extended family as well as in the Tséligato one finds the most perfect and original manifestations of the economic organization of the Sarakatsani.

121 It is the same with the intellectual, moral, magico-religious or
128 artistic manifestations. Since these phenomena belong ultimately to
594 Sarakatsani social life in general and not to the conjugal family taken separately, we shall content ourselves here with touching upon them lightly, waiting to examine them fully in a special section of our study.

121 A final remark must be made. We must call attention to the fact
594 that, since the conjugal family is integrated within various social contexts the significance of the aspects of the conjugal family analyzed here, may vary precisely in relation to this integration. It is a

/145 cont./
121 question here of a result of dialectical links which develop between
594 the groups in question and on which we cannot expand at the moment.

128 It is suitable therefore at present to stop here and draw up an evaluation, as systematic as possible, of the results of our preceding analysis before pursuing our research further.

* * * *

594 The Sarakatsani conjugal family may be represented in the form
593 of a pyramid of which the summit is occupied by the father, /who is/ the absolute master, head, proprietor and manager, but is also responsible for, and entrusted with, the subsistence and the problems of all.

Below him we find the adult sons who owe obedience to him as well as to their mother in certain cases, and who protect their sisters and their younger brothers. Since they, participating, under the direction of /146/ their father, in male tasks, they represent productive forces. To this end they may give orders to the members of the lower tiers of the pyramid. They are placed in a hierarchy according to the principle of seniority--a fact that makes subtle distinctions in the esteem each enjoys. As future fathers of a family they guarantee the posterity and
[428] the survival of the lineage. That is why they have the rights relating to inheritance. Finally, with their marriage, they are able to obtain collaborators and allies for the paternal family.

In the tier immediately below is the wife of the head and the mother of all the descendants; she owes obedience to her husband and, depending on circumstances, to her sons; she works under the supervision
594 of the men at specifically female tasks. On the other hand, she independently manages her household, the education of the children, the group of daughters and all the other female work. As a mother, especially when she has sons, she constitutes the creative source of social values. As a worker, she is a productive force. As a wife, she brings the alliance of her blood relatives. Entrusted with magico-religious skills, she performs these functions without any interference and control.

/147 cont./

obedience to husband and sons.-Female tasks.- Education of children.	MOTHER	Management of household and of female tasks.-Economic factor.- Means of alliance.-Entrusted with magic and religious ritual.
Obedience to father, brothers, mother,- Female tasks.- Education of children.	DAUGHTERS	Economic factors.-Means of alliance.-Future mothers of families.
Education	CHILDREN	Freedom
OBLIGATION	HIERARCHY of CONJUGAL FAMILY	COMPENSATION

/148/ their tasks, in order to clarify the remarks we have made (table no. 3).

Now, a close examination of this table shows very clearly that, though the members of the family are obliged to obey each other and devote themselves to laborious tasks to which they seem harshly bound, they exercise, at the same time, a certain power over each other and enjoy an esteem in society derived from their work and their tasks.

In other words: though the constraints exercised by one tier of the pyramid over lower tiers and the demands of the different tasks corresponding to each tier enslave the persons who find themselves placed there, the vertical distribution of power and prestige based on the competence of each one, gives all the members of the family and to each in particular genuine satisfactions.

As a result, it is justifiable to say that within the framework of the family, where there is an obligation of its members, there is also compensation.

We do not maintain that this duality "obligation-compensation" corresponds to an equation, and that compensation exactly balances obligation. After all, the social repercussion of this double play does not necessarily presuppose the equality of the two terms. In fact, looking at things from their human as much as their pragmatic aspect, one may conclude that, while prescribing strict rules of family behavior,

/148 cont./

121 Sarakatsani culture has created enough loopholes so that discipline
593 and family hierarchical order does not degenerate into veritable slavery
594 for its members. (23)

23. This idea is not at all anthropomorphic. It merely conforms to the point of view that has guided the course of this work. Besides, for us, all the manifestations of a given society arise from the action of its elements and from their dialectical combinations, and are therefore products of its collective consciousness.

121 On the contrary: the dialectic of obligation and compensation smooths
182 out discontent, mollifies oppositions and tensions and permits survival,
593 so to speak, and prevents the explosion of the context in which this
594 phenomenon unfolds. As a result, this same phenomenon must be classified among the causes to be found at the root of the structuring of the Sarakatsani family, and it is in this sense that one must proceed to an appreciation of its social and collective significance.

121 That these assertions cannot be reduced, after all, to an /149/
182 arbitrary construction based on a formal and abstract logic, but that
593 they express factual reality, becomes unquestionably evident from a
594 couplet which the women sing in the course of the marriage ceremony:
532 --O wife! May you have sons
585 So that one day they may subjugate other women...(24)
[539]

24. See B. Skafidas: Ibid., p. 58.

Lines full of bitterness, no doubt, but in which the apparent resignation is backed up by the hope of future compensation which, although indirect and more of less uncertain, at least lightens the difficult lot of the married woman and makes it bearable for her.

121 The Sarakatsani are conscious of this interplay. They accept it
182 and make the best of it.
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829

/149 cont./

121 593 594 Thus this issue becomes one of the principles according to which their social life is organized and which takes its place in the set of concepts that their social logic has created to that end.

THE CHARACTER OF THE CONJUGAL FAMILY.

593 594 The authority invested in the father-head of the conjugal family and the hierarchy of its members, as it has been described, prove that this unit is dominated by a distinct patriarchism.

However, observation of other families of the same type, ancient or archaic, shows that Sarakatsani patriarchism is more moderate than the latter.

The statements at the end of the second part of the present chapter illustrate this assertion, which we shall not emphasize to avoid repeating ourselves.

THE EXTENDED FAMILY

594 596 182 While the conjugal family is destined above all to perpetuate the descent group and thus the "social existence," the extended family allows the Sarakatsani to insure their well-being, conceived in their own way, of course. Without wishing to underestimate their moral aspects and their respective social functions, we may state that the first is focussed chiefly in phenomena of a biological order, while the second is determined largely by economic considerations.

596 /150/ The preceding section has enabled us to demonstrate the first. We shall now examine the second. However, it is appropriate first to distinguish the two forms in which the extended family occurs and which constitute the two variants of its organization and operation.

596 613 The first form which we may provisionally call "the vertical form," is made up of a shared ancestor and the families of his male descendants. It is therefore merely a lineage. (25)

25. In accordance with Radcliffe-Brown, ibid., p. 17 and 18, we define lineage as "all the members of the line living at a given time," considered as the social group.

/157 cont./
596 474 of economic organization of the extended family that the latter is a family herding enterprise, that has a sharing and cooperative, as well as a communal nature. Thus, the question that now arises is to know 121 596 474 why the Sarakatsani have chosen the family as the group to carry on their economic activity.

At first glance it seems normal and natural that relatives cooperate and join together economically. But once again, the appearance does not completely correspond to reality. By referring anew to two of the constant and fundamental parameters of Sarakatsani life, their geographical and social isolation and their activity as herders, we can get to the heart of the matter.

233 596 474 As a matter of fact, in order that traditional herding be profitable, the flocks must be large. Each category of livestock must be cared for separately by several shepherds who will insure its care and its security. The male work force of any conjugal family is [594] [464] numerically insufficient to assume this task. Now, inasmuch as nomadism makes recourse to a labor market outside Sarakatsani society is very difficult, the only solution to be found is in cooperation. (33)

33. See below p. 197 ff.: Tséligato."

However, owing to the force of circumstances, this cooperation cannot be limited to a simple association between herders, that is to say, to that which contractual bonds of an economic cooperation ordinarily impose on its participants. The practice of nomadic herding, apart from organized society, demands that the bonds /158/ existing between cooperators be close, deep and humane. For our herders, constantly obliged to defend themselves against difficulties of all kinds: bad weather and animal epidemics, Turks, bandits, livestock thieves, packs of wolves, etc., can rely only on themselves and their own resources. Which means that each must be willing to risk his life to all kinds of dangers and above all to expose himself at any moment and without hesitation, in order to safeguard the life and the livestock of others.

/190 cont./

494 182 These last statements permit one to say that on the economic level and on that of communal life, the Tséligato becomes the most efficient and at the same time the most important group of the Sarakatsani world. It therefore represents the best solution to these two major problems and the primary instrument of Sarakatsani adaptation to their natural and human environment.

Let us go on now to the examination of their economic system.

* * * *

121 433 The economic process of any society involves the acquisition and consumption of goods, work and its division, economic organization and, finally, the manner of distribution and accumulation of profit.

The first two points, acquisition and consumption, have been studied in connection with the Sarakatsani technology, from the point of view appropriate to the latter. It will suffice to consider them from the perspective of "needs to be met," in order to give them their full economic significance--an easy transposition which, moreover, requires no supplementary analysis. Acquisition by trade has been studied in connection with the extended family. The other aspects of this process have been examined through the analysis of the conjugal family, the extended family and the Tseligato. Thus all that is left for us is to try and bring out the principles according to which Sarakatsani economy is organized and functions and which give it its style.

438 439 /191/ Sarakatsani economy is a closed economy. We are not unmindful of the fact that ethnography as well as history have shown that no known economy is absolutely closed. Exchange takes place everywhere. However, it is certain that the Sarakatsani can, should the occasion arise, provide for their needs without having recourse to surrounding society, at least for a certain time. Milk and milk products, ample and wholesome food, can nourish them. The sector "manufacture-transformation-building" can function continually, or nearly so, without

/201 cont./

121 671 The preceding account is based entirely on the presupposition that the Sarakatsani have a law which is their own. Thus our task at present is to discover this law, to describe it, to stress its peculiarities, in a word, to establish its existence and its limits.

/202/ SARAKATSANI LAW STRICTLY SPEAKING

IN SEARCH OF THE CRITERIA FOR CLASSIFICATION AND DIFFERENTIATION

The only truly legal manifestations that we find when we examine Sarakatsani life are the obstacles to marriage, the prohibition against sexual relations outside marriage, the contract with the Tseligas, arbitration, and finally crimes and misdemeanors.

However, are these truly matters of law? And if so, must one conclude from them that the legal life of the Sarakatsani is limited to these? Or must one rather concede, along with certain theorists, that the non-existence of courts and organized forces for the application of sentences shows that these herders are without any law? (7)

(113) 7. See W. Seagle: The quest for law/cited in English/, pp. 34, 60-69.

Or, finally, must we, along with other theorists, accept the opposite opinion which holds that our nomads have law, since they have customs, and that the totality of their customs represents the law of their society? (8)

(113) 8. See E. Sidney Hartland: Primitive Law/cited in English/, p. 5. "Primitive law is in truth the totality of customs of the tribe"/cited in English/.

These alternatives show very well that in order to be able to adopt a position we must try to explore the life of the Sarakatsani from some workable criteria.

The general theory of law offers several methods of approach to legal matters, based on the characteristics of the latter, which we hereby

/202 cont./

121 67 enumerate and evaluate as distinguishing criteria.

First, each point of law has a normative character. However, 121 since norms derive from the total of cultural achievements, this 183 67 critierion cannot be used by itself.

It is necessary also to consider the source of the norm and its form. If it arises from a body having legal functions and is expressed in a form that is defined and recognized in advance, one may conclude that the norm in case is a matter of law. However, this procedure is valid only for societies that have specialized bodies /203/ entrusted with legal powers, (9)

[71] [113] 9. Modern societies are not the only ones to have bodies of this kind. They are also found in ancient and archaic societies. The codes of Hamurabi, of Zaleucos at Locris, of Charondas at Catane and of Androdamas of Rhegion (Aristotle: Politics II, 9,5,9) in antiquity, and the descriptions of J. Vanhove: Essai du droit coutumier du Ruanda and of J. Peristianis: La vie et le droit coutumier des Kipsigis du Kenya, for some archaic societies constitute some examples.

and fundamental rules determining in advance the form of laws. Moreover, in these same societies this process is not applicable if one wishes to discover spontaneous law. (10)

[113] 10. On the idea of spontaneous law: E. Ehrlich: Grundlegung der Soziologie des Rechts, p. 399 f.-- G. Gurvitch: Elements de Sociologie juridique, pp. 91, 175-78, as well as his criticism of Ehrlich in his Traité, pp. 184-187, vol. II.

Since Sarakatsani society lacks bodies of this kind (arbitration being the exception), this criterion is not applicable.

Next, one may observe the content of the norm. When it includes bilateral or unilateral obligations it is accepted as a norm of law. (11)

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671
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[113]

/203 cont./

11. See Br. Malinowski: Moeurs et coutumes des Mélanésiens p. 42.--G. Gurvitch: Ibid., p. 189.--A.R. Radcliffe-Brown: Introduction, p. 13.

However, there are liberalities or "options" determined by law, (12)

[584]

12. The gift. The paternal consent in case of marriage.

and even laws which create bonds, not only between individuals but also between an individual and a thing. (13)

13. Rights in rem.

Finally, even bilateral and unilateral obligations do not all necessarily derive from law. Something more is thus required.

The source of the norm represents another element meriting observation. If it is linked with "the idea of justice," with "what is just," "what is approved," (14) etc., it is very probable, though not certain, that the

[113]

14. See M. Mauss: Manuel d'Ethnographie p. 112.--G. Gurvitch: Ibid, p. 189.--C. Van Vollenhoven: Net Adatrecht van Nederlandsh Indië, /Custom Law of the Dutch Indies/ etc.

norm in question is a norm of law, since the same ideas apply equally to morality, religion, etiquette, (15) etc. By itself, this source does not

15. On the idea of etiquette see A.R. Radcliffe-Brown: Ibid., p. 13.

constitute a sufficient criterion to distinguish law from other norms. For more clarity let us add that, although law is invoked largely to protect material interests, thus assuming a utilitarian character, its utilitarianism is always expressed in terms of the ideas that we have just mentioned.

The aim and the function of the point examined represent another way to look at law. For the aim of the latter is /204/ to protect social life from conflicts and disorder, and its function resides precisely in the realization of this aim. However, one also finds both this aim and this function in other norms. Nevertheless, one must recognize that

/204 cont./

121 671 183 legal norms are much more efficient and dynamic in resolving states of conflict than other types of norms, thanks to their means of persuasion. Thus, we come to the following point.

The distinguishing factor of law may also come from the social guarantee (16) which accompanies it and which is expressed in sanction and coercion. Law cannot live without this guarantee, at the risk of becoming a dead letter. There is therefore no doubt: this is indeed the essence of law, socially speaking. (17) Other norms also have ways of being enforced. If these ways fail, the value and nature of the content of the norm are not affected. On the other hand, if law is deprived of all means of enforcement, it changes its character, it becomes morality, usage, incentive, etc. It is no longer law.

16. According to the apt terminology of G. Gurvitch: Ibid., p. 189.

17. With some exceptions of which we shall speak farther on, all modern legal theorists or ethnologists seem to agree. Herewith a sample of the large bibliography of law on the subject: P. Roubier: Théorie générale du droit, p. 25.--R. Monier and others: Histoire des Institutions, p. 14.--B.N.Cardózo: The growth of the law/cited in English/, p. 52.--H. Kelsen: Théorie pure du droit, p. 61.--É. Durkheim: De la division du travail social p. 33-34.--R. Thurnwald: Die Menschliche Gesellschaft, vol. V, p. 2-4.--R. Pound: Sociologie du droit, p. 306.--E.A. Hoebel: The Law of primitive man/cited in English/, p. 26 etc.

[113]

121 671 Therefore sanction and coercion validate law and reinforce the other criteria indicated by clearing them of all ambiguity and all misunderstanding when they coexist with these.

Precise details on this point will be given later on. We shall show that sometimes law is applied by direct coercion which means that

/204 cont./

121 691 the presence of agents of law forces people to conform to it when no infraction has been committed (and before such an infraction). Coercion isolated from sanction, therefore constitutes one of the criteria of law.

However, although a social guarantee represents the chief criterion of the law, this criterion is utilizable only in combination with the totality of the criteria mentioned. For constraint, whatever its form, is not necessarily linked to law.

* * * *

/205/ Now, somewhat anticipating of our conclusion, we shall state immediately that the application of these criteria shows that the Sarakatsani have law, much more rich and complicated than appearances indicate, and that this law bears the imprint of the originality of their lives.

671 128 We propose now, for the convenience of the analysis, to present first the totality of the disclosed rules and principles, classified, not according to the classificatory criteria of evolved laws inadequate in the case that concerns us, (18)

18. See J. Lips: Government, chap. X, p. 487.--O.W. Holmes: cited by Hoebel, ibid., p. 20: "The past gives us our vocabulary and fixes the limits of our imagination." /cited in English/

but according to the issues on which these rules are based. We shall make two subdivision: one devoted to non-criminal law and the other to criminal law. This distinction is based on what the Sarakatsani themselves say, although non-conformity to non-criminal law carries punishments and thus resembles penal law. Before going on to the second subdivision we shall try to show that everything we consider law truly possesses this character. For criminal law, this problem does not arise, the punishment bearing out the nature of the relevant rules.

/209 cont./

474 675 627 692 takes place between the commander of a ship and the members of his crew, according to maritime law. The special and comparable conditions of the life of the Tséligato and navigation on the high seas (21)

21. K. Karabida: 'Agroticha, pp. 39 and 47.

--a life full of diverse and unforeseeable dangers which must be faced as a group, without flinching and with the means at their disposal seem to have dictated this practice.

474 554 686 [596] Second: The components of an extended family (small lineages, /210/ conjugal families, adult sons) may leave the home they share if they are satisfied with the loyality of their head.

Third: Potential participants can avoid joining a Tséligato whose head does not enjoy a good reputation.

In the first and second cases the sanction is almost inevitable since the danger of non-conformity by those responsible affects the entire community, whereas in the second and third cases it is more permissive, in view of the fact that the danger affects only sub-groups and individuals.

627 692 554 596 474 However, these remarks would not be complete if we did not mention the interventions of the family head or of the Tséligas to settle disputes among their subjects. These interventions sometimes take the form of arbitration, sometimes of influence through the prestige of these individuals; in both cases they are ultimately upheld by the community.

121 696 692 627 Nevertheless, in order to avoid the charge that these statements are based on "petito principii" we must now prove them objectively.

If we succeed in demonstrating that the sentences reached by arbitration, as well as the judgments and opinions of groups and individuals are obligatorily imposed on those concerned, and that the latter must conform to them without fail, we shall be demonstrating at the same time that the sentences, opinions and judgments have a legal character, that therefore they are true verdicts.

Moreover, if we prove that the arbiters, the groups and the individuals,

121 696 692 629 (124)

/210 cont./

in their ajudication, prescribe obedience to the rules of the law, there will no longer be any doubt about their nature.

We shall approach this problem by examining arbitration.

Attempt at more detailed and precise investigation: In questioning our informants we learned that "the interested parties do not even think of disobeying the arbiters." Is this because, as E. Sidney Hartland (22)

22. Primitive Law/cited in English/, p. 138.--See also the view of Sir Henry Sumner Maine: Ancient Law/cited in English/, pp. 50-52 that "the habit of obedience which makes law obligatory among primitives--and even among those not politically organized." We shall come back to these problems somewhat farther on.

and with him W. Rivers and P. Lowie maintain, /211/ the primitive automatically obeys all the rules society imposes on him? Or rather is it a kind of social constraint conceived in the Durkheimian manner that operates here? Or, finally, does the agreement of the interested parties to submit their dispute to arbiters include at the same time an implicit promise to obey the sentence that will be pronounced? (23)

23. Similar to the compromissum of Roman law.

All these explanations are without doubt insufficient. The automatic obedience "of the primitive" is merely a fiction, convenient but without foundation, the frivolity of which has been criticized by Br. Malinowski (24) (and more recently by E. A. Hoebel) (25)

24. Moeurs et Coutumes des Mélanésiens, p. 17.

25. The law of primitive man /cited in English/, p. 20-21.

so convincingly that P. Lowie was obliged to give it up in a new edition of his work. (26)

26. Traité de Sociologie Primitive, p. 389.

The idea of constraint is very general and consequently too abstract to provide an explanation of this phenomenon. Finally, the "promise to obey" the arbiters would not have any practical value without a force to

/211 cont./

121 696 692 629 make sure it is fulfilled; men are always men and automatic obedience or a promise would mean nothing if carrying it out were entrusted only to the good will of those concerned.

696 692 629 626 (686) (494) On this point our discussions with our informants are very revealing. We were told that if the person recalcitrant to the arbiters' sentence is a member of a Tséligato, no other Tséligato would ever accept his cooperation. If he is a Tséligas, he would immediately be abandoned by all the participants and labelled "destroyer of sheepfolds" (Chalassostanis) --a name used to stigmatize a disloyal or incapable head.

The consequences of such a reaction are obvious. The one who is socially isolated, rejected by his own people, can expect only social degradation, economic ruin, exile into surrounding society. This last is his only refuge. But, since, the exiled one is not adapted to the latter he will see his condition worsen from day to day. Actually, this is enough to frighten the most courageous or the most refractory.

However, relying a little more on facts, we see that the recalcitrant one can hope for two things:

/212/ First, since he is a nomad, he can move far away from the place of arbitration and seek a setting where his behavior is not known, and be accepted there.

Second, assuming that someday his new Tséligato is informed of his conduct, there is a good chance that meanwhile he has been able to develop sufficiently close and honorable relationships with the "others" so that his unfortunate past will no longer be taken into consideration. Moreover, the absence of his adversaries permits him to give his own version of events in order to justify himself.

Now it is obvious that between the possibility of the application of envisioned punishment (which is relative) and an obedience to arbiters which is absolute (the person concerned "does not even think of disobeying") there is a discrepancy. It is difficult for us to assume that a "relative" conditioning can determine absolute effects. This shows that, in the

/226 cont./

671 681 and anthropological approach to laws other than those with which our advanced societies are familiar.

121 671 This phenomenon is not entirely unknown to theorists. But if some of them have had an inkling of it, no one, to our knowledge, has treated it in clear terms. (36)

36. We have mentioned some of these authors in connection with some definite point. We shall take up their theories in their broad aspects, our previous remarks being an integral part of what follows.

In order to introduce the discussion, it will be well to start with certain comments on the famous work of B. Malinowski: Crime and Custom in Savage Society /cited in English/ (37)

(128) 37. Our questions refer to a French translation included in: Moeurs et Coutumes des Mélanésiens, to which our quotations refer.

(1926). The publication of this work, in addition to the influence that it has subsequently had on the anthropological theory of law, has made it possible to state the problem correctly.

What Malinowski does is to protest against the interpretations dominated by the ideas of L. Morgan--those of "Bachofen, of Post, of Bernoft, of Konler and others who were grouped around the periodical Zeitschrift fur vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft" (p. 10), those which are found again "in the works of the French school of Durkheim, in most American and German works and in some English works" (p. 11). "Basic to all these ideas," he says, "was the postulate that in primitive societies the individual is totally dominated by the group, the horde, the clan or the tribe, that he obeys the commands of his community...with servile passivity, so to speak, bewitched" (p. 11).

He also protests against E. Sidney Hartland and Dr. Rivers, cited above, who speak of an "unconscious and intuitive regulation of social life...

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121 691 closely bound up with primitive communism" (p. 14), and against Hobhouse who states that "if we understand by legislation a totality of rules imposed by an authority to which one is not bound by personal ties of /227/ kinship or friendship, we are obliged to state that such an institution is incompatable with the social organization of savages" (Morals in Evolution/ cited in English/, 1915, p. 73, quoted by Malinowski, ibid., p. 15). And Malinowski asks himself: "Is there not, at least as far as certain rules are concerned, a mechanism of constraint, perhaps not imposed by an external authority but based on actual motives and interests and on complex feeling?" (p. 15). And a little farther on he adds: "The extreme difficulty of the problem is due... to the very complex and diffuse character of the forces that constitute primitive law" (p. 17).

Malinowski believes that he finds the solution of this problem in the "principle of reciprocity," the "principle of do ut des /I give so that you may give/ which plays a dominant role in tribal life" (p. 82). For him, "the rights of the chief over ordinary people, those of the husband over his wife or of parents over their children are not exerted arbitrarily and in a unilateral fashion, but in conformity with clearly defined rules and are made up of successions of strictly reciprocated services" (p. 37--italics mine). This is all the more true of exchanges of an economic order, called "kula" (p. 24). The whole rests on the symmetry of structure which "constitutes the indispensable basis of all savage society" (p. 24). If the individual conforms absolutely to this "give and take" which extends throughout all social life, recompense awaits him at the end in the form of economic benefits or the augmentation of his prestige. If he does not conform to it "it will not be long before he is banished from social and economic life and he knows this perfectly well" (p. 34). In sum, the "civil" laws, the positive laws which govern all phases of tribal life are therefore made up of a totality of dominant obligations, considered as rights by one party, as duties by the other, rigorously maintained by a specific mechanism of reciprocity and publicity

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inherent in the very structure of society... Their efficacy has its source in the rational appreciation of cause and effect by the natives, as well as in a certain number of personal and social feelings, such as ambition, vanity, pride, the desire to make the most of oneself by displaying one's talents, and also attachment, friendship, devotion and loyalty towards relatives...Legality represents one aspect of tribal life, one side of its structure rather than a totality of /228/ independent arrangement, a mechanism existing by itself...Legislation is a specific result of combinations which affect obligations, this combination making it impossible for the native to evade his responsibility without having to suffer the consequences" (p. 45). And Malinowski concludes his analysis with "an anticipation": "Research will one day discover almost everywhere that reciprocity, systematic influence, publicity and ambition are the principal factors which, in primitive legislation, impose obedience to its rules and prescriptions" (p. 51).

It is precisely this "anticipation" combined with the general interest in Malinowski's theory which has obliged us to dwell so long on this author.

We shall not comment on his idea of absolutely symmetrical organization and the dual structure of "savage" societies, the central axis of the whole system, on which contemporary anthropology has not spoken the final word. (38)

38. See C. Lévi-Strauss: Anthropologie structurale, chapter VIII, where the author asks: "Do dual structures exist?"

Nor shall we deny that a network of reciprocities exists in all societies, both archaic and modern, and that constraints which spring from them, especially since we have acknowledged them among the Sarakatsani in almost identical terms as those of Malinowski. Finally, we are absolutely convinced of the fact that individuals have personal obligations and responsibilities which they try to evade. However, reciprocity and constraint aside, we believe that there remains a gap which entities such as "vanity, pride, ambition, desire to make the most of oneself, attachment, friendship, devotion, loyalty, etc.", proposed by Malinowski, do not fill.

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121 671 If we address ourselves to these entities we run two risks: first, to confuse legal life with moral life in the sense that to conform to the entities enumerated means to obey certain social values sanctioned by general approval. It does not escape us that this approval implies a utilitarian aspect of which we shall speak in the next chapter. But this approval is not sufficient to insure absolute obedience by the persons concerned. Non-conformism represents "minor" dangers--the individual often is content with a minimum of consideration /229/ on the part of society.

Moreover, from the methodological point of view it appears that if one accepts this interpretation, one leaves the sociological field in favor of a psychologism limiting itself to "motivations" (a reality which only very partially explains our problem).

The second risk is based on the "motivations" in question. Ambition, pride, vanity, attachment, friendship, devotion, etc., are driving powers which can operate in two ways. They can uphold law, but they can also turn against it. For these motives, vanity for example or pride, have the power to launch conflicts and disagreements, sometimes very acute, between individuals and groups, and other individuals or other groups motivated by attachment, loyalty or friendship toward the interested parties may continue them and in doing so aggravate them and render them disastrous. Malinowski does not tell us why vanity and pride would be dominated by law and justice and not personal by self-esteem or egoism, nor why the authority of law would prevail over rebellious individualism. There is a point here which shows very well that psychology explains nothing if it is not used within concrete categories and framework.

121 671 681 This is why we believe that if we assume the mechanism of sanction and disguised coercion, we thereafter understand how individuals and groups obey law; we avoid confusion with morals and the introduction of extraneous psychological criteria into the true life of law. As a result, we base the latter on objective reality, the pressure that the "social milieu" exerts

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121 67 68 to force interested parties to obey; finally, we fill the gaps left by the acceptance of the principle of reciprocity, while reinforcing its effectiveness where it exists.

Remarks of a similar order may be made with respect to certain theories that follow the same line as the ideas of Malinowski. This is the case with P. Esmein, (39) who also quotes Hogbin, (40)

39. Le droit et ses sources, p. 6-7.

40. Le droit et l'ordre en Polynésie (in English).

with Lowie, (41) with Van Vollenhoven who, in the second volume of his work

41. Traité, p. 389.

Het adatrecht van Nederlandsch Indië, (42) /the custom law of the Dutch Indies/

[128] 42. The Dutch being inaccessible to us, we refer here to Josselin de Jong's discussion of this author, published in his study which we quote later on.

1918 /230/ (pp. 236 and 400) published after the appearance of Malinowski's book, modified the thesis proposed in his first volume, according to which law is made up of rules of behavior that are not codified and are accompanied by organized sanctions. His new thesis involves a double criterion, the mutual interaction of two customs: on the one hand, commendation and disapproval, and on the other-- intimately bound to the former--imperatives or prohibitions in the heart of the collective conscience and conduct. According to Josselin de Jong's interpretation, Van Vollenhoven did not give up the criterion of organized sanction but, under the influence of Malinowski, he enriched it.

121 67 [114] Thus the field of customary law is enlarged, but its boundaries remain uncertain. This observation by Josselin de Jong shows very well the weakness of this theory, which its author tries to overcome, without success. Furthermore, Van Vollenhoven does not tell us how and by what mechanism disapprovals and commendations are linked to the collectivity, so that no distinction can be made between opinion and morals on the one hand, and law on the other.

Thus J.- P. B. de Josselin de Jong: Customary Law /cited in English/, pp.

/230 cont./

121 67 3-7, aware of the confusion caused by the comparison of customary law with the totality of customs, as well as by the absence of a definition of law strict enough to separate custom in general from our observations, and sufficiently broad to include the entire gamut of manifestations of the principle of legality, proposes eliminating the term "customary law." For, according to him, the difference between customary law and custom is (681) one of form and not content. Thus, the authority of law is based on the conviction that its existence is necessary and is based on the threat of sanctions.

121 67 68 114 If we understand this author's idea correctly, it seems to us that, despite his effort to dispel the confusion, his positions only aggravate it. The moment he finds that the source of the authority of law lies not in sanction, a social reality and an objective and positive criterion, but in the feeling that it is useful, hence a psychological reality, the distinction between legal customs and other customs becomes impossible. Hence it is equally impossible to formulate a definition applicable to all manifestations of legality. For all the customary norms of behavior can be regarded as necessary, so that we are reduced to identifying custom in general with law, that is to say, /231/ to a repetition of the errors that we mean to combat. If we follow this author who, conscious of this risk, proposes to abolish the idea of customary law, we are left with no hope of an approach to non-evolved laws. Furthermore, the distinction between customary law and custom is not a distinction of form, but of nature. It seems to us that Josselin de Jong proposes the opposite, enticed by the fact that very often the same custom has two aspects, two potentials: one as a model of behavior, the other as a legal norm. The latter becomes real when sanction comes to its aid in seeking to enforce it. And at that moment, custom becomes purely legal and obviously acquires all the attributes of a law. If it does not appeal to sanction but if, at the moment it becomes reality, it imposes itself through other means, it presents the attributes of a model or behavior. These two situations are profoundly different. The difference is the same

A /i.e., J.-P.B. de Joselin de Jong--Analyst/

/231 cont./

121 671 681 114 one that may be established between the moral imperative to respect the life of another and the rule of the penal code forbidding homicide. The content of the two commandments is the same, but their nature is different. This is exactly what Malinowski said when he stated that legality is more an aspect of tribal life than an independent arrangement.

Finally, if Josselin de Jong had sought to discover the real sanction associated with non-evolved laws, he would have avoided these slippery trails and would have entered the path leading to the definition of customary law.

121 671 208 We should now like to consider another theory which, like that of Van Vollenhoven, also addresses itself to public opinion. It is Hoebel's theory in The Law of Primitive Man /cited in English/. According to it, in case of a claim for damages or the restitution of stolen goods, or even punishment of the perpetrator of an illicit act, if the person responsible admits his responsibility and if public opinion expresses itself in favor of the plaintiff, this public opinion then represents a tribunal and the whole process takes on a legal character (p. 25). Hoebel adds: "Primitive law is characterized by the fact that the plaintiff, in demanding his right, seeks to satisfy both his own interest and the interest of society in general. Furthermore, primitive law shows a certain regularity" (p. 28). /English quotation not found on designated page/.

121 114 671 208 Hoebel here draws quite close to the problem but /232/ does not get to the heart of it. He individualizes laws and obligations, is aware of the role of the group in the resolution of states of conflict, but he does not tell us by what process "public opinion " is enforced. Therein lies the weakness of his theory. As we have shown elsewhere, sanction and disguised coercion differentiate absolutely between public opinion and what we have called the "sentence arising from a group." Public opinion expresses an attitude of the group with regard to a dispute. When this opinion is dominated by the idea of justice and when it is armed with means of sanction and coercion, even if it is not apparent, it represents a true sentence.

/232 cont./

121 114 67 Furthermore, Hoebel's idea concerning the regularity of primitive law is only partially true. One cannot expect regularity in only cases where one has to judge according to a spontaneous law based on equity, good sense and "ad hoc". If one accepts the position of Hoebel, one must exclude all these instances of juridical life.

121 67 We shall conclude these critical remarks by examining another category of theories which base non-evolved law on its relations either to the totality of social regulations or to morality.

121 67 68 Radcliffe-Brown, in his book Structure and Function in Primitive Society /cited in English/, and in agreement with R. Pound, notes first that law is part of social control, but is not identified with it. "The field of law," he states, "will therefore be regarded as coterminus with that of organized legal sanctions. The obligations imposed on individuals in societies where there are legal sanctions will be regarded as matters of custom and convention but not of law; in this sense, some simple societies do not have law, although all have customs which are supported by sanctions" (p. 212).

Thus we come back to the formalistic conception of law: law is every rule accompanied by legal sanction and legal sanction is every sanction imposed "by a constituted authority, political, military or ecclesiastic" (p. 208).

Let us try now to see where the assertions of this author may lead. We take as an example "the negative organized sanctions" which, according to him, represent social reactions, social acts directed against persons open to social disapproval because of their behavior, and which /233/ are carried out according to traditional and recognized procedures. These acts consist of the exposure of the culprit in public, his total or partial exclusion from social life and the privileges that derive from it, the loss of his civil or religious rights or of his social rank. In addition to all this, one also finds confiscation of goods, or the infliction of corporal punishment--mutilation, flagellation, even capital punishment.

Now if one excludes law as the justification for these acts, for this punishment, what remains? Our author proposes morality and religion and

/233 cont./

121 671 681 above all the mechanism of social control (p. 208). But morality and religion can play this role only partially, as Radcliffe-Brown himself recognized albeit indirectly because, on the one hand, morality is not imposed by force without a change in their nature, and, on the other hand, punishible acts are not all related to religion. Finally, social [626] control is a very general function which involves several others and is therefore incapable of explaining this specific phenomenon.

Likewise, Radcliffe-Brown proposes that when sanctions are taken by individuals or groups against individuals and groups (vengeance, duel, blood revenge, etc.), under the control and with the approval of society, diffuse sanctions "of public opinion" /cited in English/ are involved. [114] This conclusion does not take us unawares. Since our author denies the legal character of the terrible sanctions enumerated above, applied collectively and according to a procedure determined in advance, it is natural that he should deny this character to these additional, more individualized sanctions.

[208] We have shown, moreover, that public opinion is not able to impose [626] sanctions exceeding disapproval.

121 671 The question therefore remains open. We believe that the perspective offered by our own position makes it possible to avoid the confusion of law with other social regulations and to avoid the paradoxical idea that societies can live without law when they do not have a specific judicial apparatus.

Marcel Mauss, for his part (chapter VII of his Manual), says: "In societies that ethnography singles out all legal phenomena are moral phenomena, without exception; which does not mean that all moral phenomena are necessarily legal in the strict sense" (p. 110). It remains to be seen how one can distinguish law from morality. /234/ "Legal phenomena," says Mauss, "are organized moral phenomena (p. 111)...We know the presence of morality and religion only from the presence of infraction and the idea of sanction. There is moral obligation...when there is diffuse sanction;

/234 cont./

121 671 there is legal obligation when there is a precise definition of obligation and a precise definition of infliction and for punishment... Obligation is simply more rigid and more legal in the case of law" (p. 112). That is not all. Mauss proposes still another criterion. "All laws are considered good by definition; then again, conformity to laws is good; it is necessary to social life. Everything that is in conformity is good, everything that is antagonistic to this conformism is bad. One would therefore recognize the moral and legal phenomenon by the presence of the idea of good and bad, previously defined and always sanctioned" (p. 112).

121 671 681 Now for Mauss the distinguishing criteria of law are three in number: precisely defined obligation; precisely defined infliction /of penalty/ and punishment, hence sanction; authority based on the good, including the value of conformity to rules. These ideas are not unknown to us. We have criticized them in the foregoing. Let us recall that up to a certain point we share them. However, we see ourselves obliged to remark that if one contrasts diffuse sanction appropriate to moral phenomena with definite sanction, fixed and organized, as appropriate to law, one leaves out manifestly legal phenomena such as obedience to arbiters which appears not to be enforced by sanctions and, what is worse, one risks linking these phenomena to morality. This is the case for example, for G. Gurvitch, when he gives priority to morality over law in patriarchal societies. But we shall speak of this in the next chapter.

We should like to conclude this theoretical test by pointing out that if we introduce into the arsenal of the theory of law the idea of disguised sanction and coercion we shall be equipped with a new, very effective criterion which permits us to follow paths that have hitherto been inaccessible.

It does not escape us that our argument is based only on one example and that consequently, before being more fully accepted, it must be tested in other social contexts.

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121 /235/ Nevertheless, testing it against the experience of the authors
671 enumerated seems to reinforce the hope that disguised sanction and coercion
681 also exist elsewhere, and that in any case it represents a good working hypothesis.

* * * *

121 Be that as it may, the solution of disguised sanction and coercion
671 fits well into the Sarakatsani way of life. It would be difficult to
681 imagine any other way. Faced with the dilemma of either not having
182 organized justice (in view of the difficulties of living in small groups and nomadically), or of having one that is ineffective for lack of organization to maintain it, Sarakatsani society has chosen the solution described which meets the demands of the problem. It assures and guarantees the functioning of the social organization and it enforces order without burdening the organization of the group. Therefore the fit between this solution and the social framework seems perfect.

FINAL EVALUATION

671 Customary law, spontaneous law, structureless and disguised law, these are the aspects under which Sarakatsani law presents itself.

676 Issuing from collective sources, this law is also imposed by group agents which are the same as these sources, even in cases where ajudication and its execution are confined to individuals--representatives of the group which recognizes their perogatives, functions and efficacy.

Though intimately bound up with other social regulations, it retains its autonomy. And though exposed to the influence of magico-religious beliefs, above all when it is spontaneous, it clearly keeps its rational character.

Without abolishing the rights and responsibilities of individuals, it favors groups and cooperation, and disfavors individualism. Individual rights exist only when they are compatable with the "group" and in sympathy with the latter (43) --the "invisible government" according to the expression

/235 cont./
671 of P. Radin. (44)

44. P. Radin: Le monde de l'homme primitif, p. 221 f.

671 /236/ Its sanctions guarantee its functions, at once distributive,
681 preventive, restitutive, repressive. They are not taken from the law
182 of retaliation, as the instance of the vendetta particularly demonstrates.
[627] They are based on the idea of the defense of the social equilibrium or its reestablishment if it is temporarily disrupted.

Thanks to the mechanism of disguised coercion, it acquires, citing the expression of Mauss, (45)

45. Manuel, p. 110.

a character of strongly felt intimacy and community, for it can become involved at any moment in the smallest details of the life of our herders.

671 Seemingly simple, if not simplistic, but basically very complex,
182 Sarakatsani law meets the need for social control with extreme efficacy, which one would not dispute if one looked closely at its social context. For the dynamics of Sarakatsani law, transmitted in the social framework to a large extent give it its stability.

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CHAPTER IV

MORAL PHENOMENA AND MORALITY AMONG THE SARAKATSANI

577 Morality among the Sarakatsani is neither systematized nor doctrinal.
121 It is bound up with many aspects of their lives, in symbols, attitudes, conduct, habits, customs, language, cultural works, all of which serve as its vehicles. (1)

1. This phenomenon is not peculiar to the Sarakatsani alone. See A. Bayet: La science des faits moeurs, p. 17.

In attempting to recognize it and make it clear, the problem of an operational criterion of procedure arises. "In order to observe the moral phenomenon, one must also know what characterizes it, by what distinctive mark it can be recognized," Durkheim (2)

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577 12 2. Definition of the moral phenomenon in Sociology et Philosophie /Sociology and Philosophy/, p. 49 f.

said, emphasizing the methodological prerequisite necessary for any study of moral phenomena.

Now if it is true that morality is a sum total of ideas by which behavior must be prompted, if these ideas represent values, and if behavior which does not conform to them is socially disapproved, /then/ these assertions, expressed concretely in terms of Sarakatsani reality, are sufficient to guide our research. They must also determine the outline of this chapter.

* * * *

577 The fundamental values of Sarakatsani morality are the family, chastity, the "community," tradition, finally insubordination.

The analysis of the aspects of their lives that we have studied up to now testifies to this. Everything that has to do with the family (descent, relations of all kinds between its members, including economic relations) is intimately bound up with morality. /238/ Chastity involves 577 831 the control of sexuality in its known forms, the prohibition of adultery, the guarantee of the legitimacy of descendants, the virginity requirement and very strict morals imposed on young girls. Although this subject is connected with the family, we shall emphasize it particularly, in view of its importance for the Sarakatsani. When they speak of morality they are [834] referring to sexual life. Moreover, an assault against decency and virtue is considered by them as more grave morally than an attack on a person's life. If a woman is sexually abused, the infamy falls on all the members of her family whose honor is thereafter tarnished. Honor and sexuality go [171] together among our herders, as they do, in fact, in all of Greece. In the [195] context of the same ideas, discussion and allusions relating to sexuality are systematically avoided, although frank speech is common among persons [834] [888] of the same age and the same sex. But it is necessary to be reserved toward [604]

/243 cont./

[578 L8 G71]

law, the supremacy of which one cannot deny. (9) clearly, the morality

[114]

9. G. Gurvitch: Ibid., p. 199, states an opposite opinion not, it is true, with regard to the Sarakatsani but in relation to patriarchal structure in general. It is difficult for us to accept this opinion based on the consideration that Hebraic society of biblical times, Homeric society, the latifundia, the zadruga etc., are ruled by morality. It seems to us that Deutoronomy, the scene of the chaining of Achilles, the very ancient Roman law, etc., as well as the type of life of these societies shows the opposite.

of the Sarakatsani is nowhere in contradiction with their other social regulations, with the rules deriving from religion, magic, knowledge etc., and as a result it never creates problems of conscience or behavior, nor

[182]

of internal social rupture. On the contrary, being perfectly integrated in a perfectly coherent system, it offers the Sarakatsani a solid as well as an indispensable foundation for safeguarding their traditional social life.

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PART THREE

121

/245/IN THE PRESENCE OF THE MYSTERIOUS, THE WONDERFUL, THE BEAUTIFUL

/245/ "In vain, experience says 'it is false' and reason says 'it is absurd,' humanity clings all the more to absurdity and error."

This phrase by Henri Bergson (1)

1. See Les Deux Sources, p. 105.

could serve as the motto for the title of this section if the point of view proper to anthropology did not impose on us the duty not to criticize but to explain "the absurd" and "the error," to recognize them as stages through which humanity passes in its epic course toward the conquest of the world by the mind. (2)

2. See above, Chapter III.

128 In this third part we shall try to study in detail how the Sarakatsani,

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123 to try to systematize this incoherent material and submit these conclusions
124 to the verification of informants who have proved both the most reliable and the most accessible.

121 A methodological principle has been of great use to us during this work. The practices and beliefs of a coherent society must form an equally coherent whole, without internal contradictions. If, in reconstructing them, one does not succeed in integrating them into a system, one can be certain, or nearly so, that the approach followed has failed. One must then begin again /248/ from other hypotheses. Of course it is necessary to allow for deviations insofar as special reasons require.

Comparative ethnography and the history of religion of peoples in the Mediterranean basin have aided us very much. The result of our account will testify to this.

128 The present chapter is divided into three parts: the first deals with "The magical practices of the Sarakatsani and their historical and cultural origins." It focuses on the subjects to which the practices refer. The second is concerned with the analysis of "the magic thinking of the Sarakatsani." The third deals with the "social functions of Sarakatsani magic."

121 The keynote of this research is the effort to know fully the deepest layers of the soul and thought of our herders.

MAGICAL PRACTICES AND THEIR HISTORICAL AND CULTURAL ORIGINS

181 FERTILITY OF HUMANS AND ANIMALS.

In the universe of Sarakatsani social values there are two which, in view of the conditions of their existence, represent the foundations of their conception of material well-being. The first is crystallized in the following maxim: "True wealth means numerous offspring." The second is expressed in the general esteem for large flocks.

121 The practice dealing with this domain are multiple and correspond to
842 various aspects of procreation and gestation. It is appropriate to distinguish between acts aiming at the prevention of sterility and those which

/248 cont./

121 842 [233] directly promote fertility, and those, finally, which, though directed toward different ends, indirectly aid fertility. Practices dealing with human beings are in many respects different from those applied to animals But since the ideas and beliefs that determine them are almost the same, we shall study them together.

* * * *

842 The phenomena that call forth the intervention of magic, classed according to cases, are the following, beginning with sterility.

842 262 [825] /249/ In order to avoid it, the Sarakatsani woman and young girl must abstain from eating the meat of a sterile animal, the defect of the latter being considered contagious. On the other hand, if a family is very large it is advisable to give the mother such meat in order to stop her fertility. (1)

1. See B. Skafidas: Ibid., p. 1104.

842 754 Now for the male: under his wedding clothes the husband must keep his soiled drawers, for if this underwear should fall into the hands of his enemies they would use it to practice magic on it and cause his impotence (2)--any object which is even temporarily in contact with someone

2. Ibid., p. 463.

842 825 789 being the best means of transmitting evil to them. Furthermore, the newly married couple wear the head of a viper as an amulet. We shall not dwell on this point, for we shall have occasion, to come back to it. Finally,

233 825 789 as far as the livestock is concerned, it is necessary, in order not to provoke sterility, to be silent about the fertility of animals and above all about the number of animals that have mated, probably because of the "evil eye."

842 [531] Non-sterility having been assured, it is necessary to pass from the negative to the positive, therefore to act appropriately /Fig. 100 appears here/ to promote fertility. First, human fertility: the bottom of the wife's

/252 cont./

825 character of a sexual symbol because of its connection
121 with women.-- ΠΑΥΣΑΝΙΑΣ : Περιήγησις
(831) 11, 10. 30. Suetonius: Divus Augustus, 94, etc.
According to Sir Ar. Evans: Palace of Minos /cited in English/, vol. IV, p. 138 f., It is the guardian of the hearth and of the house «οἰκουρὸς ὄφις».
M. Nilsson: Minoan Mycenian Religion /cited in English/, pp. 247, 248.--As the personification of Zeus it is, according to Homer, the protector of the enclosure «ἕρκειος Ζεύς».
Being chthonian, it is related to the dead, according to G.
(842) Van der Leeuw, ibid., p. 67. We have seen the role of the latter in fertility. The caduceus of the psychopomp Hermes, /namely/ snakes entwining the tree of life, symbolize this last point very well.--b) Byzantium: In the magic books of Byzantium the snake recurs as an antidote to sexual impotence:

Φ. ΚΟΥΚΟΥΛΕΣ : Βυζαντινῶν βίος, τ. VI, p. 240.

c) Modern Greece:

Ε. ΧΑΤΖΗΙΩΑΝΝΟΥ : Ἔθιμα Κύπρου. Φ. ΚΟΥΚΟΥΛΕΣ :

Ibid., p. 243.

121 We are therefore compelled to assert that this common symbolism covers an
842 identical content. If the Sarakatsani are Greeks, if they have lived in
821 the same cultural ambience and in the same geographic area as the other
825 Hellenes, why should we conclude that these /253/ practices, which are
823 the same, take on a different meaning when one passes from one case to the other? It seems to us, on the contrary, that this would be a misinterpretation, the more so since no aspect of Sarakatsani life warrants our formulating any other hypothesis or inferring from it another interpretation. Moreover, if one has recourse to the methodological criterion
(1116) accepted above, that of the possibility of integrating the content of

/253 cont./

different practices into a coherent system, we see that from the moon to the snake, from the snake to the earth, from the fire to the moon, there is a continuity, if not apparent and logical, certainly symbolic since all these forces are merely variants or avatars of the belief in the great creative force which dominates the world and which is personified in the Great Goddess, the Mother-Goddess. (17)

17. On the evolution of the cult of the Mother-Goddess and her avatars from the Minoan epoch to the imposition of Christianity we refer to the works already mentioned and full of information by E.O. James: Ibid., pp. 143, 144, 153, 154, 155, 156, 158, 159, 160, 264, 165, 166, 167, 168, and J. Przyluski: Ibid., pp. 87, 134, 135, 144.

However, it would be erroneous to assume that the Sarakatsani when they seek to influence fertility through the medium of symbols stemming from the belief in the Great Goddess, also worship the latter and can therefore be considered followers of a religion other than Christianity. It is necessary to see here another phenomenon, well known elsewhere, (18)

18. See R. Bastide: Sociologie Religieuse /Religious Sociology/ p. 16.

which occurs when one religion replaces another. While yielding to the new, the ancient religious practices continue to exist, but henceforth become integrated in the magic practices, and are considered as such while simultaneously entering into a certain syncretism which permits them to survive, the /254/ officially religious ideas hallowing the officially profane ideas which would otherwise be intolerable. (19)

19. In political law as well as in canon law of Byzantium one finds countless rules forbidding the practices deriving from religions that were ancient and described as magic, as for example: Codex Theodocianus, 9, 16, 2.--Codex Justinianus, 9, 18, 4.--

[illegible]

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128 These last observations complete this general survey of the magic practices of our herders and their historico-cultural origins.

Though the pages we have devoted to them do not exhaust the subject--the choice of the more significant facts constituting the requirement /286/ for every work of this kind--it seems to us that the picture drawn is sufficiently rich to permit us to push our analysis forward toward new problems.

THE MAGICAL THINKING OF THE SARAKATSANI

121 789 153 What is the specific /type of/ thought that defines and justifies the magic practices and rites of the Sarakatsani? That is the new problem which we shall attack within the context of this study whose chief concern is anthropological.

If studied from the outside, this thinking proves to be entirely oriented toward action, leading toward the end to be reached. It takes into consideration only the methods handed down by tradition, without ever questioning their effectiveness, whether the desired effects are obtained or not. In this thinking, means and effects are not bound together by a rational type of judgment, but are joined together in belief.

However, this definition is very general and, on that account, applicable to all kinds of magic. We must therefore seek to formulate another /definition/, more subtle, hence more representative of the characteristics of the magic of these herders.

[124] In this matter we were unable to count on the possible aid of our informants. Those who practice magic never ask themselves about the thought underlying it. Thus we find ourselves obliged to proceed by inference and to conduct our research from materials included in the foregoing title /section/. We can pin-point its stages in relation to the following reflections:

If it is true that in order to "recognize" a thought we must retain the ideas in which it is expressed, it will be necessary, in order to recapture

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121 789 153 Sarakatsani magical thinking, to try to keep the ideas that emanate from it apart from the phenomena in which these ideas manifest themselves.

We shall therefore start by determining the fundamental ideas governing both the magic action and the means put at its disposal. There is here a static aspect which, as such, offers to our eyes only a limited view of our problem. In order to broaden it, its transposition to a dynamic perspective seems indispensable. We shall therefore examine under what conditions magic and the corresponding ideas are born, what is /287/ the process of their formation, what is the totality of ideas that accompanies their application.

That is not all. It is also necessary to see what the Sarakatsani idea is concerning their magic. We shall rediscover it included in their attitude toward magic. Then, by using the conclusions drawn from these observations, we shall proceed to an attempt to define the magic thought.

Finally, we shall compare magic thought and non-magic thought in order to emphasize the characteristics and the structure of the former, and we shall conclude with some critical reflections bearing on our interpretations and our conclusions.

The Postulates that Make Possible Magic Action.

The magical thought of the Sarakatsani puts forward certain fundamental ideas, true postulates, which serve as points of departure and a basis for magical action. We shall enumerate them:

The postulate of transmissibility. This is the conviction that virtues, qualities, characteristics, functions, etc., existing in the forces ruling the universe or in certain definite objects can be transmitted to men or to beasts if they /the latter/ are put in contact with these forces or these objects.

The postulate of the opposition of forces. In order to defend his person and his goods against threats arising from various sources

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121 789 153 (supernatural beings, hidden evils, evil eye, etc.), man can oppose them with forces in his favor. The result is a mutual neutralization of opposite influences which permits men and animals to keep safe from evil.

The postulate that forces will not destroy themselves. The fact that a person is a harmful force, or rather its symbol on themselves, suffices to hinder the latter from releasing its baneful influence: it cannot act against itself.

The postulate of simple removal. The evils, represented anthropomorphically, can be forced to remove themselves if one attacks their supposed senses (sight, hearing, smell, touch, etc.) in a disagreeable fashion.

The postulate of purification. If, despite the precautions taken, man or beast are attacked by magic influences, they are at the very least contaminated. A purification is /288/ possible by means of favorable forces which neutralize the contamination by exerting an opposing influence on it.

Finally, the postulate of representation of desired situations and effects desired. Sometimes, all that is needed in order to cause a situation or obtain a desired effect, is to represent them in one way or another, by gestures, words or dramatic scenes. In this case the representation is as good as the reality.

This postulate is connected, up to a certain point, with the conviction that man, in certain circumstances, is in a position to set in motion for his benefit the forces ruling the universe.

The most important of these postulates (98)

98. A certain number of examples illustrating them will be found below, p. 290.

is that of transmissibility, not because it is found in most of the rites and practices, but because it is one of the assumptions underlying the

/288 cont./

121 others--an assumption that is both ontological and operational.
789 A governing idea comes to light behind these postulates and serves
153 as their foundation: a desired result can be obtained if man, the livestock and their lives are brought into relationship with an appropriate agent--the source of a favorable influence. The magic operation thus involves two components that are placed in association.

Which leads to a new question: How is this association brought about? Two more postulates furnish the solution:

1. Contact. The components of the magic action are placed either in direct contact or in mediated contact. In the second instance one of the elements of the action--and at that moment it is a matter of a cosmic force or a qualitative reality, hence arbitrary--is represented by a symbol or a sign serving as mediator.

It is interesting to note that often an object is chosen as a symbol which itself has a relationship, obviously assumed, with the force it represents, so that the latter will have transmitted to that object some of its properties. Thus the symbol in question has a double efficacy. It becomes a means of contact both indirect (as a symbol) and direct (because of the properties which have been transmitted to it.) That is the
826 case, for example, with the blood of the woman in childbirth on the lips of
844 the child, it symbolizes the creative forces and at the same time has properties of its own since it has already been in contact with the creative forces. In this case we may speak of a mixed contact.

/289/ 2. Representation. The association is sometimes brought about by simple representation. Instead of being brought about materially, the contact is represented. This is the equivalent if not the corollary of the postulate of the representation of situations, but the two things must not be confused. In the postulate, the representation produces the final effect. When the representation is a means of association, the contact is simply imitated without going further.

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This kind of association also includes the juxtaposition in space of the two components of the magic action.

CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH MAGIC IS CALLED UPON TO INTERVENE.

We may distinguish four categories:

a) Psychological: the Saraktasani must cope with problems of urgent necessity. In most cases the issues are vital.

b) Cultural: Sarakatsani knowledge and technology are incapable of solving these problems.

c) Social: it is Sarakatsani society, in large part, that defines the needs and makes them urgent. Furthermore, the social framework hampers the development of knowledge and technology. Thus it thwarts, albeit indirectly, the rational solution of problems.

d) "Human": man, like all the other species, must act upon his environment in order to survive. Magic is a means of dominating the world through the action that it inspires.

Two conclusions are to be drawn from this classification:

a) Each of the conditions enumerated above may be isolated from the others only abstractly, which means that in reality all four make up an indissoluble whole.

b) These conditions are reduced in practice to strong motivations, at once intellectual, affective, socio-cultural and even instinctive (it is self-preservation which, basically, is involved), which set in motion the magical thinking and constitute an atmosphere favorable to its development.

It would therefore be erroneous to assert, as has been done on several occasions, that magic, as thought or as action, is based solely on man's fear and anguish before the unknown and the mysterious, on the thought of his weakness in the face of entities /290/ that are beyond him. Reality demands that we approach the study of magic on the basis of all the phenomena that underly it, in other words, in a multidimensional manner.

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THE PROBLEM OF THE FORMULATION OF POSTUALTES AND MEANS OF ACTION.

The postulates as well as the means of magical action are based on the observation of the sentient world. Transmissibility, mutual neutralization of opposing forces, non-self-destruction of forces, withdrawal from the painful and disagreeable are phenomena derived from the everyday /experience/.

Man, through his own experience of heat transmission from a warm body to a cold body, of the contagiousness of diseases, of putrefaction of organic matter placed near matter already decomposed, readily concludes that contact with an object possessing a desired property of quality is a sufficient means of acquiring it. (99)

99. This same ideas is also found in H. Webster: La magie "the magician is incapable of distinguishing the category of resemblance from that of identity... It is an axiom of magic that imagination is the equivalent or reality: Ficta pro veris accipi," p. 71.--However, Webster does not see that if the magician does not make the distinction between resemblance and identity, the reason is not a logical incapacity, but psycho-sociological factors, as we shall see later on.

Similarly, he concludes in favor of other postulates from analogous facts. If two men push a rock from opposite sides and they are equally strong, the rock will not roll. If a person wants to pass through a hedge of thorny shrubs, the thorns will make him turn back. And it is contrary to all probability to suppose that a source of any influence, especially when basically it is anthropomorphically conceived, can act against itself and in such a way as to destroy itself.

Thus, by deduction, man arrives at the two principal ideas of all magic, that of transmissibility, on the one hand, and that of the effectiveness of contact, on the other, and consequently /he arrives/ at all the others.

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121 789 153 At the base of all this may be seen an activity of the mind developing from analogical reasoning, which makes possible the deductions in question.

Nevertheless, how can one not ask oneself what impels the Sarakatsani to accept and apply practices supported only by analogical reasoning, not objectively /291/ verifiable? It is all the more impossible to escape this question since these herders have enough critical and rational mentality, as their technology and their social organization show, to test the efficacy of the procedures based on the ideas expressed above. Thus, the failure to verify postulates and procedures shows that in the process of their formation other factors intervene which make them a subject of general belief. It is not the established value of the analogical reasoning which imposes the postulates and the methods of action. It is the dynamics of these other elements which force their acceptance.

We are therefore faced with one of the most delicate problems of Sarakatsani magic which we must clarify before proceeding further. We believe the way to solve it is through the following hypotheses.

Everything may begin by chance. A coincidence, a combination of circumstances or some result taking place in the presence of two components, actually or presumably related, suffices for the relationship to be considered the cause of the effect.

It may likewise be supposed that man, under the emotional impetus arising from the need to face a problem for him and those around him that is serious and otherwise insoluble may decide to act by analogical reasoning. If a certain effect is produced, though it be illusory, or, what amounts to the same thing, if other factors intervene which, rightly or wrongly, seem to hinder the realization of the desired result, he will be led to believe that his procedure is effective.

In the third place, it is probable that a simple hypothesis based on analogical reasoning related to a treatment or any curative goal and

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121 789 153 put forward in a doubtful manner is assumed by an interlocutor, finding himself in conditions favoring this type of reasoning, to be a prescription or a method of action to be followed.

These examples, which could be multiplied, may give an inkling of how the nucleus of a future conviction originates.

Once this method is established, the collective consciousness of the group in which this phenomenon develops will pass judgment on it; it will accept it or reject it. But if /the method/ is accepted, the group will give it its prestige, its authority over individual consciousness, and will sacralize it.

/292/ Furthermore, duration, time will add its own confirmation. The comments, the narration, the repetition, will enrich the initial idea. In view of the fact that the beginnings of the initial experience are rooted in the past, manipulation will draw from it increased prestige. And insofar as technical or cognitive progress do not disturb it, the belief in its effectiveness will remain alive.

121 Obviously, all this is merely hypothesis, not diachronically verifiable since ethnographic observation has no way of studying traditional phenomena at the time they are born. Nevertheless, it seems to us that these hypotheses are governed by certain phenomena of an analogous order, which are produced in our societies and of which we herewith give a brief description.

First, analogical reasoning in connection with curative phenomena is not foreign to our "civilized" mentality. Some examples drawn from recent experience show this in a striking manner.

The introduction of antibiotics in the therapy of certain scientifically defined diseases was immediately followed by their immoderate use for everything, even for simple ailments for which they are not effective. The beneficial action of novocaine on arthritic pains of old people has led to the conviction that this medicine combats old age. At one time (100)

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100. In 1952.

the rumor spread in Greece that a plant, elaterion, constituted a means of treating cancer. And since in popular Greek elaterion is called bitter gherkin, it was believed that it could be used against diabetes "for it has a bitter essence which, as such, can neutralize the sugar in the blood."

In all these cases, passages from the known to the unknown under certain affective conditions is clear.

If practices of this kind do not become lastingly rooted in our society it is because the possibility of criticism and reply always exists: specialists and prestigious institutions are there to combat them, aided by contemporary methods of diffusion and popularization of scientific knowledge, and even by the state which neutralizes purveyors of falsehood.

Moreover, the members of our societies have, on the one hand, a much more "technicized" intellectual frame of reference than the /293/ members of traditional societies; on the other hand (a fact of major importance), they can "hope for another solution" that scientific research will propose sooner or later.

As for the process of the acceptance and propagation of these practices, which basically represents the social aspect of the problem, the mechanism of the birth and spreading of rumors in our societies is very revealing. We know that rumor has as its point of departure the combination of a cognitive fact and an emotional state. We also know, especially from the experiments of G.W. Allport and Leo Postman, (101)

101. G.W. Allport and Leo Postman: The psychology of rumor /cited in English/, p. 247. See also J. Stoeztel: La Psychologie sociale, pp. 249-255.

that rumors obey the principle of "sharpening" /cited in English/: the

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121 accentuation and enrichment of certain components of the fact spread by rumor, so that precisely because of this inflation, other components of the same fact are obscured and thus reality is distorted. Finally, 121 according to G. Durandin, "from the moment one knows that a thing was 289 real, one knows all the more that it is possible, and one is led to invent other things of the same type." (102)

102. G. Durandin: Les rumeurs, p. 17. See also p. 25; also his statement that roseate rumors "belong to the domain of magic thinking," p. 18.--Yet this author, by his statement, has merely established a parallelism of motivation which, according to him, is the same in both cases: "the roseate rumor represents the imaginative realization of a desire," he says (p. 18); and he implies that magic is only that. But he does not push his comparisons far enough to arrive at the role that the mechanism of rumor plays in the birth of magical beliefs.

Now, by combining these several assertions on "analogical practices" with the mechanism of the spread of rumors, we succeed in understanding how a fact becomes a model of action, a curative practice, even though it is based on fortuitous relationships and judgments: in each case where one event, occurring in a climate of emotional exaltation, is transmitted from mouth to ear, it goes through successive transformations in which desire and reality are confused, it is crystallized into a coherent account and finally becomes the object of general conviction.

At the end of this process one has helped in the creation of a myth. The conviction that one may obtain a curative effect by the means described, basically constitutes but a myth. It is precisely the mythical character of the conviction in question which prevents the verification of its effectiveness and which produces it. By following this course, man subdues the unknown and in so doing obtains hope and consolation. (103)

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103. On the relations of this myth which might be called a "social myth (through all myths are social) to the cosmological myth see below Chapter VIII.

/294/ This said, we must ask ourselves whether actually this parallel between the mechanism of the formation of "analogical" curative procedures observed in our societies and that of magical procedures of traditional societies is a fortunate parallel, and also whether our conclusions with regard to the first can be applied to the second, in view of the difference that exists between these societies.

We believe that the reply is affirmative:

Contemporary instances of analogical curing and the procedures of traditional white magic are called upon to serve the same needs. They originate under the same objective conditions, that is to say, where knowledge cannot intervene. They respond to the same psychological needs of security and deliverance from the anguish in the face of the unknown; therefore they manifest themselves in a climate which does not favor a distinction between the wished-for and the real.

Finally, the influence that society exerts is the same in both cases. The expectation of a solution in the past of the group as well as individuals comes before every creative event of practice and conviction. And at the moment this event takes place the channels of its diffusion--individuals, sub-groups, groups, etc.--are the same; they are called upon to take part in it and they actually do so, determining the same results.

Therefore, the inference from synchronic phenomena to diachronic phenomena is not arbitrary, and does not constitute a « μετάβασις εἰς ἄλλο γένος ». Our hypotheses are legitimate and it seems to us that they do not distort reality. Consequently, we may definitively conclude that: 1st, both the postulates and the means of Sarakatsani magical action are based on analogical reasoning.--2nd, this reasoning born under

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789 /294 cont./
121 the pressure of necessity and in an emotional climate that springs
153 from it, then is acted on by the dynamics of Sarakatsani society by way of a mechanism very close to--if not identical with--that of the creation of rumors.--3rd, finally owing to these conditions, it /this reasoning/ is transformed into patterns of action--objects of an unshakable belief from which it derives its validity and the reason for it its existence. It then becomes myth which, while summoned to action and repetition, has no need for a foundation other than its own character of myth, since myth is never accompanied by doubt.

/295/ Nevertheless, we have not yet shown how two phenomena came about. These are, on the one hand, the postulate of the representation of situations and desired effects and, on the other, the represented contact.

121 Now, the acceptance of this postulate and this type of contact implies
153 once again the use of analogical reasoning.
789 If an effect is produced by bringing into contact two already existing components, why should not another effect be produced by bringing into relation one component (man or animal) with the representation of a situation or a desired reality?

Likewise, if material contact permits transmission and other effects, resulting from it why does contact merely represented not allow this?

The fact that the second component of the magical action as well as the means of action are merely symbolized in the representation is not a sufficient reason to consider this postulate and this means as qualitatively different from others. The relationship between symbol and thing symbolized is so intimate that finally symbol and thing symbolized become identified.

121 Thus we see that the process by which the postulate and the magical
789 means in question were formed cannot differ from that which has been accepted in connection with other postulates and means, despite the

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121 789 peculiarity of the original phenomenon which is only apparent. As for the rest, this phenomenon, for the same reason as the other original phenomenon, is acted on by the dynamics of Sarakatsani society, and finally becomes a myth. But the social aspect and the mythical aspect are inseparable elements of all magic.

121 IDEAS GOVERNING THE APPLICATION OF POSTULATES AND PROCEDURES. CHARACTER OF THESE IDEAS. THE PRINCIPLE OF HOMOGENEITY.

The ideas governing the application of the postulate of transmissibility are developed on two levels, depending on the nature of the problems to be solved.

The latter are divided into two broad categories: fundamental problems, on the one hand, and, on the other, problems which are certainly important but presuppose that the first have been posed and resolved.

/296/ The fundamental problems are related to the sources of life (creation of a new life: fecundity) and to the functioning of nature (regeneration of nature: universal fertility).

The other problems concern the determination of sex, the acquisition of physical, physiological or biological properties, the acquisition of a state of being, the fulfillment of curative effects or of certain practical effects. (104)

104. The terminology which we have used here distorts reality up to a certain point since the Sarakatsani do not have the same classification of reality as we. Nevertheless, the examples and explanations that follow will permit an avoidance of misunderstanding.

In order to arrive at a solution of the fundamental problems the (789) (776) Sarakatsani, as we have seen, appeals to forces that his mythology has revealed to him: beliefs centered on the Mother-Goddess and her avatars. (105)

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105. If we use the term "mythology" to denote this system of beliefs it is because, as we have explained on page pp. 283-285 their original religious character has disappeared. The part of their content that has survived constitutes henceforth a mythological explanation of the world, adopted by the Sarakatsani and a justification of their magic, with which these beliefs are connected. See also p. 415 f. and pp. 421-423.

121 789 In order to solve the problems belonging to the second category the Sarakatsani has recourse to elements of the visible world.

Despite the risk of repeating ourselves, we must recall certain facts to illustrate these assertions, as well as to justify what follows:

[842] --In order to decide the sex, a boy is set on a bride's lap so that she will give birth to boys.

--In order to acquire physical, physiological or biological [829] characteristics they use elements having (or presumed to have) those same (or presumably same) characteristics. A bride walks on metal in [823] order to acquire its strength. If a man wears a thing taken from wild [825] animals it will communicate to him their resistance, their agility, [842] their adaptability, etc. To eat the meat of a sterile animal makes the [233] woman sterile. An old skull placed on the fence transmits its solidity to the livestock.

--In the third place, to acquire a state of being one again has [824] recourse to elements of the visible world and their characteristics: the seeds of the pomegranate or the grains of rice, symbolizing by their number the multitude of products, assure prosperity and wealth. The sweetness of honey with which one coats the entrance is a sure token of a happy life. The bride's horse must have /297/ a light coat, for a [231] [822] black horse calls to mind the conventional color of the devil.

--In order to induce curative or preventive effects, a simple

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121 789 mechanical device sometimes suffices. This is the case, for example, with the rope and the knots placed on the mother-to-be so that the child will remain firmly bound to her.

--Finally, in order to create certain practical effects, the results of certain favorable situation, the latter are reproduced in allegorical representations: young girls sitting on the ground to represent ewes suckling their lambs.

These examples are significant from several points of view. We see first that, for the Sarakatsani, the conception of the child and the determination of its sex are phenomena of a different order; that the fertility of nature is independent of the volume of products; that these phenomena which, according to our science, we would classify under the same headings (biology--a mechanism of the yield of the earth) for they come from different parts of reality. (106)

> 106. That is why our language can, as we have pointed out, cause confusion when it is applied to certain facts of Sarakatsani life. We use it for want of anything better. We hope that our explanations will clarify these peculiarities.

121 792 789 This shows that for them the world is divided into two parts, the one governed by the creative force of the universe, the other subject to the reciprocal influence of elements that these forces have already created.

The part that is subject to forces is, basically, subordinated to what the Sarakatsani consider to be the first causes of the world. These causes, which release fecundity and fertility, the foundation of all existence, escape their knowledge and their technology, and this by definition, because of the grandiose and mysterious element that characterizes them and that far exceeds the properties of the visible world. No creature, no object created possesses sufficient power to act on that which created it.

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121 789 792 842 On the other hand, once created, the visible world can act on itself, for it belongs to the same category of reality. Thus, the conceived, or presumably conceived, child can be submitted to the influence of another child for the purpose of deciding its sex. But no child can, by its influence, induce the creation of a new life.

121 789 /298/ We believe that we are touching here on the essential character of Sarakatsani ideas of life, of nature and of the possibilities of /their/ acting on them. It is, moreover, in terms of these ideas that we must understand the differentiation of their magical action bearing on the problems we have enumerated. But above all it is in this intellectual ambience that the postulate of transmissibility is called upon to intervene and to inspire magical action which is then differentiated when put in concrete form, in terms of the ideas previously set forth.

The result is that there are grounds for speaking of a simple transmission in connection with other problems, taking into account the reality in which this transmission is practiced.

However, since mythology that determined the first type of transmission has been forgotten by the Sarakatsani, we must ask ourselves whether such a distinction corresponds to the facts.

Now these facts force us to recognize that though the myth-originators of the rites are forgotten, the existence of universal forces, even anonymous ones, is always felt behind the objects they symbolize and that consequently the operator finds himself clearly in the domain of myth and the mythical climate, even though the latter are no longer expressed in a formula or a narrative. (107)

107. We shall not stress further the specific traits of the myth, for we shall come back to them in one of the subsequent chapters.

The mythical transmission exists therefore, and its mythical foundations

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121 789 have nothing unusual about them if we consider the phenomena which it aims at and the lack of other means of influencing them.

121 82 789 Simple transmission presupposes a knowledge of the outside world based on perception and observation, and even on common sense. Obviously, this knowledge does not always correspond to scientific facts, but one cannot, for all that, deny its existence. It is this same knowledge that has given rise to the formation of the postulate of transmissibility and which here determines the content and orientation of the corresponding practices. Thanks to it the Sarakatsani succeeds in grasping the qualities and properties of different objects, qualities and properties which he lacks and of which he has need; finally, it is this knowledge that permits him to symbolize some desirable effects by means of the properties in question. This process is likewise bound up with (153) analogical reasoning.

Myth does not occupy a place in the framework of simple transmission as such. However, it promotes /299/ the effectiveness of the latter, as we have shown in the preceeding paragraph.

These two types of action--mythical transmission and simple transmission--inspired by the postulate of transmissibility, as well as the ideas underlying them are not opposed to each other but are complementary. The ideas refer to two aspects of the world which ultimately become one. And these two kinds of action become integrated in a single process of which they represent two complementary aspects. At the point where the practices defined by myth reach their limit, the practices inspired by knowledge and analogous reasoning enter the scene to complete the work of the first ones. The ultimate goal is man and his life.

On the other hand, observation of transmission practices shows--and we must emphasize this particularly--that the components of the action which are brought into contact present a homogeneity of qualities. There is a correspondence between the property, the quality, etc., which one

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121 82 989 wishes to acquire and the virtues of the different objects with which one puts oneself in contact in order to satisfy this desire. The strength of iron and the skull ênsure the strength of the living being. The sweetness of honey /ensures/ the sweetness of life. The multitude of seeds, the multitude of products. The male child, the birth of boys, etc. In this correspondence we see that quantity calls forth quantity, quality /calls forth/ quality, the abstract and the symbolic /call forth/ abstraction and symbolism, the functional /calls forth/ the functional. However, and this deserves to be emphasized very specially, this homogeneity of qualities points to a classifications of reality made by the Sarakatsani themselves. There is no need to try to justify them scientifically. The fact that these classifications exist is very significant. Equally significant is the fact that the magical action is possible only within the same category of the real.

121 989 Shifts from one type of quality to another come about only within the limits of symbolism, a fact which does not deny the homogeneity but confirms it.

[153] Underneath this action we must recognize a thinking both positive and selective, testifying anew to the existence among the Sarakatsani of rationality and a knowledge of the world, closely bound up with their magic.

The application of the processes of contact within the framework of practices inspired by the postulate of transmissibility /300/ is also determined by homogeneity. Direct and material contact, on the one hand, and mediated contact, on the other, are carried out only on the basis of a choice made in terms of what one seeks to transmit: the mythical and abstract can be transmitted only through the intermediary of a symbol or a sign (the moons on the skirt; black, the sign of mourning), for they represent all of intelligible reality. On the other hand, the transmission of a concrete property (blood from the paschal lamb on the forehead of

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boys against anemia) requires a direct, if not material, contact.

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The ideas connected with the application of the postulates of the opposition of forces, of the non-self-destruction of forces and of purification, through the medium of practices which they inspire, are the same as the preceding ones.

These are forces evoked in connection with practices aiming at the neutralization of obscure and mysterious threats, and the forces, as we have said, always come from myth: the caul of the child and the log buried at the entrance of the enclosure, symbols of creative forces that neutralize the threats against life. The dogs' excrements and the /weights from/ the spindles of the fairies, worn as amulets, prevent demons and fairies from acting against the child, for the latter has appropriated their properties, and the forces will not act against themselves. Water, like fire or the earth is the source of life, these sources purify whatever is contaminated by evil spirits and remove the latter, for they are the opposites of the latter.

Once again the principle of homogeneity goes into effect, forces neutralizing forces.

The placement into contact obeys the same principle because it is practiced through the medium of symbols, as is fitting when one deals with forces.

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Nevertheless, the practices of simple removal seem to resist explanation on the basis of the ideas behind the action inspired by the postulates thus far enumerated, since, in order to remove the evil spirits considered as first causes, one has recourse to second causes--malodorous fires, thorns, noises, colors, etc. But this inconsistency is only apparent. Since evils are /301/ represented anthropomorphically, they are acted against as though they were men, second causes, hence through

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121 789 the medium of elements of the sentient world. It is in this manner, moreover, that direct contact is used in order to bring into relationship the components of the action.

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Finally, with regard to the ideas bound up with the application of the postulate of representation, we must emphasize first that their study must be adapted to the demands of each case. Specifically, the corresponding practices consist of the ritual of Pure Monday, the scene of Christmas Day, vows and curses and, clearly, black magic.

The evocation of forces, and consequently the recourse to myth, takes place in all cases except in the scene of Christmas Day. The orientation of the practices--fertility, state of being and longevity, threats against existence--determines the recourse to first causes.

(536) On the other hand, the scene of Christmas, during which young girls, seated motionless on the ground, imitate nursing ewes, comprises only non-mythical elements, since this action is based on second causes. A situation is reproduced which must be carried out in connection with elements of this world. We have shown, moreover, the role that analogical reasoning plays in this practice.

In all these cases, the placement into-contact is represented.

Now, the homogeneity between the components of the action as well as between the kind of action and the means chosen is absolutely complied with.

THE SARAKATSANI IN THE PRESENCE OF THEIR MAGIC.--THE RITES.

The Sarakatsani practicing his magic is not "cold-blooded." It is not only desire, conditioned by need, and the hope of arriving at some kind of result; it is not even the abstract idea of having to do with cosmogonic forces which moves him. What thrills him is the nature of these forces that myth discloses and suggest to him, dictating at the same time specific attitudes toward them. The study of these attitudes

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121 will enable us better to show both the cosmological conceptions of the
789 Sarakatsani and the specific characteristics of his magic.

789 Now, the forces--first causes of the world, arouse /302/ contra-
783 dictory feeling in the Sarakatsani. (108)
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108. This is a universal phenomenon, well known by theorists. See, for example, R. Caillois: L'homme et le sacré, pp. 39, 41, 46-49, and his quotations.

We find there, side by side, hope and fear, trust and respect. Once their mission is accomplished, the forces that have given birth to the child become dangerous. The purification of the child and the woman in childbirth after the birth aims to rid them of the presence of these
[562] forces, thereafter considered impure. Likewise, the woman, the symbol
[841] of universal fertility, is considered impure, hence dangerous, at the time of the menses, for at that time her creative attributes and consequently the forces underlying them appear in full array. The snake,
[825] for its part, is used as an amulet only after it has been blessed by the Church, so that the dangerous properties that are always present alongside its beneficent properties are diminished. And we shall see later on that a dead person, though bound up with fertiltiy, is also considered impure; he causes a contamination from which one must be purified.

789 Furthermore, the Sarakatsani feels himself altogether dependent
12 on these forces. He evokes them he addresses himself to them but his magical manipulations do not inevitably lead to the desired effect. The
[124] forces must still deign to grant him their favors. On this point our informants were definite.

[782] In the third place, it is sometimes apparent that the Sarakatsani tries to propitiate the forces. He offers honey to the Fates, cheese and butter to the waters, wine to the earth--true libations offered to the entities that determine his destiny.

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789 These remarks, though brief, show very well that the magical action
121 of our herders has about it nothing mechanical or constraining. The forces do not act automatically or obligatorily simply because the magic practice has been carried out. The wish of man, expressed in his acts, is evocative but not determining. It seems that the wish represents, rather, a challenge thrown out to these forces, but without the certainty that the latter will rise to it. Finally, when the desired effect is
[781] produced the Saraktasani is dominated by the feeling that something
[EH14] exceptional has been accomplished, and his soul is filled with wonder and exaltation.

121 All these states of the soul, a product of mythical ideas put into
789 /303/ magical thought, are bound up indissolubly, actually or potentially,
153 with his thought. This enables us to understand that Sarakatsani magic, despite the intellectual aspects that we have particularly emphasized, is not a mechanical or rational magic, but includes components and living experiences which make it much richer than analogical reasoning or any other reasoning.

To come back to our problem, the states of the soul as described constitute for Sarakatsani magical thinking a sort of ambience with which the latter is suffused, although in actuality they cannot be separated from it. Seen from the standpoint of structure, this ambience represents the foundations of all the layers of their magical thinking, whether the rites involved or those transmission or any others.

121 This means that the rites of simple transmission, too, are
789 accompanied by uncertainty with regard to the achievement of the desired effect, and by respect and wonder at the result accomplished. Obviously, these feeling are relatively subdued as compared with those that arise in connection with other magic practices. One finds here nothing mechanical, automatic or, coercive that would require the desired property and quality to be transmitted to man or animals.

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121 789 An explanation becomes necessary. The belief in the effectiveness of magical practices that we have recognized as steadfast among our herders, and the profound feeling that the forces are not obliged to act because the practice has been carried out are not contradictory assertions. If the forces do not always respond to man's appeal, it is not because the practice is ineffective, but because the forces are superior to man and his acts, hence by definition relatively free.

Now we are able to understand other incomplete phenomena which represent for magical thinking so many problems to which it must truly give a solution.

121 789 788 If the magical action is clothed in the form of a rite and if it must be carried out solemnly and faithfully, that is because the myth in action manifests itself only ritually, the mythic suggestion being expressed adequately only by the implication of the rite. Likewise, the domination of the myth by the grandiose can be externalized /304/ only by solemnity. And as for the fidelity of the execution, this results from the concern about effectiveness, for in practice effects are not produced if one does not follow the prescriptions to the letter.

MAGICAL THINKING.--AN ATTEMPT AT A DEFINITION.

121 789 811 All the ideas that we have brought out in analyzing the postulates of magical action, its methods, the process by which postulates and methods are formed and the ideas accompanying their application sufficiently reveal the nature and internal structure of the magical thinking of the Sarakatsani.

It is a pragmatic type of thought which develops from a fundamental idea according to which the desired effect is obtained by "placing-into-contact" the beneficiary of the magic and a source of influence.

This idea, likewise pragmatic and forming part of magical thinking, occupies in the latter the same place that causal connections hold in technology. It is formed on the basis of everyday experience and by

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deduction through analogical reasoning. Thereafter it is put in concrete form and gives rise to certain postulates which are likewise pragmatic, and which determine the action.

This point of departure having been established, the magical thinking, in search of a suitable source of influence, oscillates between two poles which are not external to it, but are integrated in it, following closely the Sarakatsani scheme of classification of the different parts of the universe: myth and the perceptual knowledge of the external world and common sense. Magic thinking turns toward myth when it finds itself in the presence of fundamental cosmological and anthropological problems (life--fecundity--fertility), and also obscure forces and influences arising from first causes or representing them, which stand outside all experience and all knowledge. On the other hand, it is prompted by knowledge when it deals with all other problems relating to secondary causes.

Magic action is thus organized accordingly. The "placing-in-contact" is sometimes oriented toward mythic entities, sometimes toward perceptible or intelligible elements, depending on the ideas on which it is based. In order to act upon first causes /305/ it is necessary to proceed by mythic entities. To act on second causes, either may be used depending on the case. Hence the differences in the content of ritual and magical practices. Hence also the conclusion that magical action is possible only within a given category of reality, a fact which gives rise to a working principle, that of the homogeneity of the components of the action, of homogeneity of the property to acquire and the property to transmit.

However, magical thinking is thinking "under certain conditions." It is therefore engaged in, and consequently exposed to, various psychological, social and cultural dynamics which render its propositions and manifestations objects of social myths. The latter give it veracity and make unnecessary any effort to verify its statements through experience.

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811 The result is that magical thinking is a complex in which multiple elements, bound together by dialectical relations, meet and intersect: cosmological and anthropological myths, social myths, rational proceedings and elements (classification, knowledge, experience, judgment, reasoning), intentions, imagination, various "actual experiences" and motivations, affective and otherwise (desires, hopes, fears, anguish, as well as respect and exaltation in the presence of the mysterious, the grandiose, the transcendent), social dynamics collective elements, etc.--in a word, manifestations of all psychic and social phenomena.

All these elements are present in magical thinking and naturally in the action that it determines.

Magical Thinking and Non-Magical Thinking: Their Respective Structures.

The procedure and the structure of magical thinking being thus circumscribed, comparing it with non-magic thinking will prove relatively easy.

At the level of procedure, the two follow an identical process. Starting from certain premises, they advance by successive propositions to a conclusion.

On the level of their structures they are different. The difference manifests itself in the nature of their premises and the /306/ guarantees for the veracity of their conclusions, as well as in the general structure of their components. While, as a whole, non-magical thinking uses premises made up of rational elements and proceeds to rational and experimental verification of its conclusions, magical thinking involves mythical premises, and its conclusions are supported by myth. Between these two extremes there are intermediary situations which minimize the difference. Non-magical thinking also backs up its conclusions with social myths. And magical thinking bearing on rites of simple transmission contains premises and propositions with a rational coloring while buttressing its conclusion by the myth. These observations show that a certain continuity

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121 789 811 between non-magical and magical thinking can be established. Passage from one to the other proceeds from common thresholds and is a function of the kinds of segments of reality envisaged and the kinds of segments of the possibilities /there are?/ of acting on them. The parts subject to knowledge are within the scope of rationality. The parts subject to myth are within the scope of magical thinking. Since between the parts of reality there are dialectical relationships, the same relationships are reflected in the different modes of action upon reality. We shall see in what follows this same phenomenon manifesting itself on another plane, that of the mutual relations of myth and knowledge. As for the structure of these two kinds of thought, we see that the summit of the hierarchy of components is occupied, in the case of non-magic thinking by rational elements, in the case of magical thinking in simple transmission practices by rational and non-rational components equally, and within that of purely magical thinking by mythical components.

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This said, it is time to ask ourselves whether the magical thinking of the Sarakatsani does not indicate a specific mentality? Or, in other words, whether the coexistence of magical thinking along with knowledge and rational thinking does not force us to envisage the existence among them of a plurality of logic or a plurality of mentalities?

[128] Since Chapter III of this part is devoted to the study of knowledge and myth and their reciprocal relations, we shall not enter into an examination of these questions in order not to /307/ anticipate. We [171] shall limit ourselves merely to the statement that these phenomena are universal and not peculiar to the Sarakatsani, and we shall make it clear that they are due to the dynamic brought to bear on their thinking by their specific social structure. This is a conclusion that deserves to be kept in mind, for it will be useful to us later on.

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However, before ending this section, another conclusion, this time methodological, asserts itself. Since Sarakatsani magical thinking proceeds from psychic and wholly social phenomena, it is obvious that any unilateral and unidimensional approach must be excluded if one wishes to arrive at an explanation of it.

That is why, in our own approach, we have not resorted to the principal theories that explain magic. Thus, a brief critical account of these theories appears necessary to justify our position.

SOME CRITICAL REFLECTIONS.

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Let us begin first with the intellectualistic explanation of J. Frazer revealed in his works: Le Rameau d'or, pp. 3, 5, 24, etc., and Les origines magiques de la royaute, p. 35. Frazer sees in magic an erroneous interpretation of the association of ideas by resemblance and proximity, expressed in the more general idea of sympathy (109)

109. The idea of sympathy already figures in the thought of Greek antiquity and of the Middle Ages. See: M. Nilsson: Les croyances religieuses, p. 193, who cites Plotinus, and M. ΨΕΛΛΟΣ: Εγκυκλ.

between objects and phenomena--a sympathy devoid of all human depth--which permits magic manipulations. Even in cases where supernatural beings are invoked the magician treats the latter "as inanimate agents, by force and constraint and not by conciliation or propitiation." (110)

110. Ibid., p. 67.

Now, nothing is more foreign to the magical practices of the Sarakatsani than this "cold prescience" of Frazer which, in its generality, has already been criticized by Mauss and Hubert, (111)

111. M. Mauss and R. Hubert: La Magie, pp. 4, 13, etc.

by R. Bastide, (112)

112. R. Bastide: Sociologie Religieuse, pp. 19, 28, etc.

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789 114 essential to this experience in which emotion suppresses rationality /317/ and common sense. Mythical and sometimes magical would often fit better" (p. XV). We believe that this thought of Leenhardt's, which relates to the demands of the problem, at once ontological and methodological, renders unnecessary any other critical evaluation on our part. Moreover, when the Sarakatsani proceed with the formation or acceptance of their mythologies, their immediate experiences are not mystical, but mythical. The terminology of Lévy-Bruhl confuses the outlook and obscures the reality of our problem.

Nevertheless, as was the case with Mauss, Lévy-Bruhl has clearly felt the importance of myth to the phenomena in question. However, he has oriented his observations toward the non-conceptual character of mythical thinking, its fluidity, its recreational value, etc., (118)

118. An idea very close to that of Plato: Timée /Timaeus/, 59 edition.

(pp. 73-74), without trying to go further.

These critical reflections on the theories enumerated do not exhaust the problem. We are thinking, particularly, of the theories that explain magic by psychoanalysis, which propose solutions in keeping with that discipline. (119)

119. These interpretations have been harshly criticized by anthropologists such as Malinowski: Moeurs et Coutumes... p. 101, and C. Lévi-Strauss: Anthropologie...p. 229.

789 121 We shall deliberately remain outside this circle of ideas, for neither our training nor the way in which we have conducted the enquiry permit us to enter this domain.

Yet these same critical reflections constitute a supplementary justification for our terminology. All through our analysis we have carefully avoided using the traditional terminology of magic, as for

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789 121 example sympathetic magic, homoeopathic magic, analogy opposition, etc., as well as the rules of magic action corresponding to these types (for example, similia similibus curantur/like cures like/, pars pro toto /a part for the whole/ etc.). Terms and rules are weighted with specific meanings, bound to the theories they convey or to contexts different from those of the Sarakatsani--which would involve the risk of creating misunderstanding about the specific nature of Sarakatsani magic.

/319/ THE SOCIAL FUNCTIONS OF SARAKATSANI MAGIC

789 The magic of our herders, like any other cultural product, exerts its influence and applies its dynamic on numerous levels.

On the morphological and ecological plane, first of all, its presence is strongly felt. The social sphere of the Sarakatsani is enriched by it. In addition to the parts linked to various social phenomena (dwelling, economic exploitation, localities or migration, etc.) we have others that magic suggests. As a result of magic, there is a division of space (822) into sacred and magical (right-left) and a distinction of places into ill- (823) omened, neutral and auspicious (mountain passes, gorges, ravines, streams, crossroads, springs, etc.).

789 82 The cardinal points are linked to life and death, with good and evil (east-life, west-death). Certain parts of the dwelling and the enclosure acquire a special significance, for their choice is prescribed for the performance of certain rites (hearth, threshold, the top of the entrance, the flagstones of the stroungha, etc.). The three kingdoms, mineral, vegetable and animal, play a role in the life of man which no longer emanates from their nature, but from the place they occupy in the framework of magical ideas. There are harmful trees (fig and walnut), protective shrubs and plants (brambles, holly, asparagus, feliki, willow, bulbs, grains etc.). There are wild and domestic animals (goats, dogs, cats, donkeys, bears, turtles, bats), birds (crows), aquatic animals (crabs,

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789 182 152 154 121. Of course, in connection with another society. See R. Firth: Primitive Economics in New Zeeland /sic/ Maoris /cited in English/, p. 265.--A similar idea is found in Br. Malinowski: Les Argonautes, pp. 420-421, and in R. Benedict's article /entitled/ Magic.

789 182 Magical beliefs and magical thinking impede the progress of knowledge and the creation or adoption of new techniques. Often, magical practices, examined coldly, lack any rational meaning. Sometimes they are dangerous (for example, child-bearing on the ground). However, there is compensation. Magic restrains progress but, on the other hand, it influences the psychological climate, hence action.

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121 789 Let us now try to show the influence of magic on collective behavior, statuses and social roles. It is certain that all three have close relationships with it. A number of forms of collective behavior, ritual and procedural, owe their existence to magic. The status of men and women [562] [554] includes, among other things, magical prerogatives for each sex. Social roles with magic content are encountered constantly in Sarakatsani social reality.

789 182 /321/ In connection with technology, we have said that magic hinders its change. The same is true for collective behavior statuses and social roles which are sustained by magic. This is due chiefly to the conservative and traditional character intrinsic to its very nature. Magic that changes every day is no longer magic. There is, therefore, a [571] standardization of the elements in question, which produces a stabilization of the social relationships that arise from them and, as a consequence, a consolidation of the social structure in sofar as it involves these relationships.

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CHAPTER II

RELIGION AMONG THE SARAKATSANI

771 121 The Sarakatsani are Christians under The Orthodox Church. The study of their official religion is not within the scope of this work. What merits analysis here is their interpretation of the teaching of the Church, that is, their way of applying Christianity to the conditions of their life.

771 128 This interpretation appears: first, in their way of celebrating certain religious festivals; second, in their funeral customs; third, in their religiosity and in the nature of their religious feeling.

The present chapter will be organized around these three aspects. Our account will conclude with some remarks on the social dynamics of religion among these nomads.

RELIGIOUS FESTIVALS AND PRACTICES

796 771 The difference between the offical interpretation of Christianity and that introduced by the Sarakatsani appears in the celebration of the festivals of Christmas, St. Basil (New Year's Day), Epiphany, St. Lazarus, Holy Week and Easter, St. George, St. Demetrius and certain other saints of whom we shall speak in due time.

(182) The principal aim of the ritual followed in connection with these festivals is to appeal to the beneficent influence of religion and cause it to intervene favorably in life. Religion represents forces: it is fitting to profit from them.

771 789 182 178 We rediscover here the fundamental conception that dominates Sarakatsani magic. More than that. The study of concrete facts will show that certain ideas determining magic practices survive in religious practices, but this time "Christianized." Thus, between the magic and the religion of our herders there is a certain continuity, a common threshold which insures passage /326/ from one to the other, without, however, denying the originality of each. However, the participation of

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829 in their lives. Clever management on the part of the men, especially
[596] the heads of families and of the Tseligato, ensures the cohesion of
[404] the group and its good functioning.
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On all these points, tradition with its models and its precedents
829 offers a solid and permanent support.

From the systematic point of view, all this knowledge is rational,
[811] reflective and adequate. But since this /355/ same knowledge must
[562] guide action oriented toward men ("we" or "others"), intuition and symbolism, ideology and myth make their appearance and are strongly felt in their hearts.

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181 The very fact of the existence of magical manipulations among the
811 Sarakatsani enables us, without resorting to other evaluations, to assess their knowledge of nature, man or animals as limited. Thus a new problem arises, that of the factors that exert an unfavorable influence on knowledge and its development among these herders.

Now, these factors arise from the specific nature of the social framework and the culture of the Sarakatsani. Actually, their social life does not offer any opportunity for knowledge to flower. Among them there are neither groups nor individuals charged or authorized to spend their time advancing it. They do not receive any training in this direction, and they lack educative means. Moreover, they cannot even
[171] benefit from the culture of surrounding society because of their migra-
[361] tions and their isolation. Finally, they are hostile to any new idea, presumed dangerous insofar as it lacks the guarantee of experience.

121 Furthermore, traditional ideas thwart cognitive advance, but from
811 "within" this time. In order for knowledge to be possible, an adequate and preliminary classification of phenomena is indispensable. For it will give birth to concepts and general modes of operation, (5) which

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121 811 5. See C. Lévi-Strauss: La pensée sauvage, p. 32.

one could not do without if one hopes to enter this domain. In order that science may develop, J. Piaget says, (6)

6. J. Piaget: Epistémologie, vol. III, p. 261.
--See also the same author: Traité de Logique /Treatise on logic/, passim, and the comments of R. Bastide: Le Candomblé, pp. 240-241.

the human mind relies on classifications of reality, organized "into systems of concrete operation," which are translated into propositions, into hypotheses. Observation and experience ensure contact of the latter with reality. Next, one advances with the help of the "logic of propositions, joining concrete operations by means of new operations of implication or exclusion among propositions... "

811 /356/ In the case of the Sarakatsani, the classifications of realtiy to which the new operations lead have a double nature. First, we find once again mythical classifications. The different parts of reality are classed as wholes, not according to the principles of a scientific typology of phenomena, but in terms of mythical considerations.

811 772 There are many examples. Let us take the division of the world into two parts: favorable and unfavorable, to which correspond other dichotomies dealing with the different aspects of life, namely:

Favorable	Unfavorable
East	West
Right	Left
Religious	Black magic
Curative magic	Obscure forces and influences
Life	Death
Health	Illness
Fecundity	Sterility
Birth of sons	Birth of daughters
Birth of ewes	Birth of rams
Fertility	Drought
Prosperity	Insolvency
Freedom	Slavery of imprisionment

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See also Vol. XXXIII/62 of C.I.d.S., passim, dealing with myth.

cognition. /358/ In order to justify the heading we must analyze myth, look at it from the inside.

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121 Cosmological or anthropological myth is not all an imaginary or arbitrary tale, as is generally believed. It is a totality of statements expressed symbolically whose roots are buried in a profound vibration of the total man faced with the natural or human universe and endeavoring to discover the origins of the latter, its evolution, its inner working. (9)

9. See A. Jensen: Mythes et Cultes, p. 83, M. Leenhardt: Do Camo, p. 226, C. Lévi-Strauss: Anthropologie, pp. 228 and 225, R. Thurnwadt: L'esprit humain, p. 136.--On the symbolic form of myth, R. Bastide: Sociologie et Psychoanalyse, p. 28[illegible].

Reason plays only a partial role in this drama, and often after the event. Thus, myth constitutes an area where man and the universe meet. There results from it /the meeting/ a specific image of the world, the external form of the myth. (10)

10. M. Leenhardt: Ibid., p. 248, "myth is felt and experienced before being comprehended intellectually and formulated." We concur with this statement. That is why we have accepted mythic transmission in the magic of the Sarakatsani, despite the fact that they have forgotten mythology, at least in the form of a coherent account.

In order to form the statements of myth man does not proceed from concepts "but from perceptions /"percepts?/, images, events and fragments of

/358 cont./

121 events." (11) He does not use logico-causal, discursive or analytical

11. See C. Lévi-Strauss: La pensée sauvage, p. 27 f. We find in the author's work a comparative analysis of myth and science. --From another point of view M. Leenhardt: Ibid., pp. 170-171, gives us a very interesting description of the way in which myth surrounds its object starting from perception. However, this author maintains that myth is a product "of affective, objectivized thinking." In our opinion, it emanates from the "total psyche" in which, of course, affectivity is included. We believe that Leenhardt's qualification of mythic thinking as affective is due to the fact that it goes beyond rationality and discovers the roots or myth in the life force, and why R. Bastide: Ibid., p. 281, while citing Bergson, says that "the root of myth is always instinctive." Yet it is necessary to recognize that R. Bastide introduces further the idea that the "social" exerts an influence on myth, but /he does so/ in order to explain its proliferation and without going further. With regard to the point of departure of myth C. Levi-Strauss: Ibid., pp. 354-357 believes he is able to find it in "the messages," according to the theory of information. This hypothesis requires extended verification before being accepted.

thought, but an intuition through which he seeks to discover the primary causes of reality. The relationships to which he proceeds, develop with the help of analogical or anthropomorphic reasoning, but after his intimate contacts with the world have been realized. Thus the groups of ideas which he attains do not constitute /359/ "operational groups" similar to those one finds at the core of knowledge.

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[12] Myth never proceeds to demonstrate its statements. Yet it imposes them. That is because it does not address itself solely to reason, but to the totality of the human psyche. When man finds himself at an impasse in trying to solve a vital problem, myth offers him an image of the world, created by himself in his own way, an image which exerts on man an influence liberating him from his distress, which is caused by the unknown and by his suffering. Myth explains only by recreating reality. At the same time it inspires the conviction that what it states is true. For it is in a position to satisfy both the soul and the mind. From this point of view one may compare myth with the great works of art which, without proving anything, liberate man by foretelling the world and his destiny.

In a very large number of cases, cosmological myth is bound up with religion. (12)

12. See R. Bastide: Sociologie Religieux, pp. 52-57.

Without wishing to take a stand on the problem so much discussed in its relation to "the sacred," we shall remark merely that religions also include cosmologies and that consequently there is here an area where knowledge, myth and religion meet.

Now, these points seem radically to separate myth from rational and positive knowledge adequately expressed. But on the other hand, it is true that these same points, bring myth extraordinarily close to intuitive knowledge expressed in a symbolic or significant form.

That is not all. Though it is certain that knowledge and myth are not identical, it is likewise certain that knowledge and myth converge, each in its own way, toward an explanation of the universe. There is thus between them a correspondence of aim.

These two conclusions, however, are not a sufficient basis for definitively associating myth and knowledge within the framework and

/359 cont./

121 on behalf of our initial hypothesis. It is still necessary to examine their reciprocal relations as they develop in the life of the mind.

* * * *

/360/ We can first show relations of opposition between knowledge and myth. Their respective conclusions are opposed insofar as they are categorical judgments of reality. Hence arises the problem of knowing which will prevail: knowledge or myth?

In a general way, observation shows that with each new conquest of knowledge, myth recedes further. Yet, as we have seen in connection with magic practices, it surrounds with its prestige the favorable results of knowledge and thus makes knowledge socially more effective. In this connection one may ask whether the term "myth" does not change its meaning when one goes from the first to the second of these assertions. Myth which gives way to knowledge is cosmological or anthropological myth. Myth supporting knowledge is a social myth in the sense described in magic. But this difference in quality does not correspond to a difference in its profound nature. If myth permits man to place himself in relation to the world and to find encouragement, confidence and security, it is easy to agree that the myth-support of knowledge fulfills the same functions. However, instead of creating an image and addressing itself to forces of other entities more of less personified, in order to explain the world, this myth places at the center of its statements the idea of an all-powerful science capable of explaining and dominating the world and consequently of relieving man of the burden of his problems. It is not the criticism of the possibilities of science which impels toward the birth of scientific myth, but the psycho-social factors which we have examined in connection with magic. These factors are so powerful that we see eminent scholars who should by definition be aware of the limits of science, adhere without reservation to scientific myth. (13)

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13. Jensen: Ibid., p. 48, gives the example of M. Planck.

Between these two kinds of myth there is therefore a difference of constituent elements, but once the elements of scientific myth yield to the process of "mythization," these two kinds become identical.

However, there remains the sociological aspect. The final outcome in the opposition of knowledge and myth is dependent on the sociocultural context. Also of the kind of knowledge. If the context is favorable to knowledge, hence to rational thinking, /361/ knowledge will assert itself. If not, it is mythical thinking that will take precedence. History furnishes a number of examples of antagonism and competition between myth and knowledge, which, basically, is conveyed and manifested in the conflict of their bearers, of social groups with opposing ideological core, the one group being dominated by myth, the other by knowledge. The victory of one of the rivals will mark the victory of their ideology. Furthermore, insofar as new knowledge does not radically upset the existing social structure, it is readily accepted. If not, myth will resist. It will appear conservative. For the traditional social framework, concerned about its own duration and using myth as a solid support, is hostile to any change that would endanger the latter.

Nevertheless, the relationships between knowledge and myth are not exhausted in their mutual opposition. Myth very often profits from the success of knowledge. It utilizes knowledge to construct its own edifice by integrating knowledge within itself. Yet before using the latter it reinterprets it in its own way, to conform with its internal or external coherence. In the same way, knowledge profits from ideas and intuitions included in myth, in order to formulate its own working hypotheses.

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Myth never contradicts experience. In all cases in which it sets forth propositions that are not verifiable by experience or are contrary to experience, the phenomena that it evokes unfold in a specific context in which "all is possible." Consequently, it never results in non-sense which would repudiate it.

Now, this rapid survey of the relations of myth and knowledge shows that they obey a dialectic which not only includes an opposition of these terms, but also mutual involvements, complementarities and reciprocities of perspective, depending on the specific context in which they are integrated and to which they refer.

Having said this, it becomes obvious that myth and knowledge are not always incompatable and opposed, but that they cooperate closely in the life of the mind.

This assertion enables us to affirm, by recapitulating all our remarks on myth and knowledge, that the first may be considered a complement of the second. Furthermore and particularly, that both, while preserving their respective peculiarities, /362/ basically represent two phases of the same process, that which leads to a grasp of the world. (14)

14. It is significant that G. Gurvitch: Ibid., pp. 122 and 126, speaking of kinds and forms of knowledge, does not give any room to "mythic" knowledge. However, he introduces it when he describes systems of knowledge in patriarchal societies such as the society of the Sarakatsani, qualifying it as "prosaic" (p. 128). We find the same qualification elsewhere: La Vocation, Vol. I, p. 460, in connection with the same type of society. "Although the patriarch is at the same time priest, neither religion nor magic enter deeply into the life of these societies; in calm periods one may observe that their function is very

/362 cont./

121 prosaic...while at the same time very much a matter of routine." However, Abraham and the prophets of Israel struggled continually with Jahveh, the Achaians argued and lived side by side with the gods, the nymphs, etc., our Sarakatsani constantly summon up their magic. Besides, we cannot agree that Hebraic, Greek or Roman mythology was a prosaic mythology. Hence daily life was not prosaic either as far as it was guided by mythology. This is not to say that the "secular" aspects does not exist. It is only a matter of giving it its true proportions.

It remains to be seen whether these conclusions are applicable in the Sarakatsani case.

* * * *

[187] [182] As a matter of fact, in analyzing their magic, we have seen that, since their knowledge is limited, the Sarakatsani have recourse to magic ritual in order to enlarge their field of action. We have likewise seen how rational thought and myth go together for practical ends, how they cooperate and structure one another to explain and dominate phenomena such as fecundity, fertility, birth, death, sickness, health, prosperity, etc. In short, we have understood how Sarakatsani intelligence and experience, on the one hand, and the mythology of the Mother-Goddess, on the other hand, combine in their magic ideas, forming their pragmatic cosmology and anthropology. We therefore need not repeat this. However, the whole of this account testifies to the complementarity of myth and knowledge among the Sarakatsani.

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This phenomenon is, moreover, universal. (15)

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15. Thus M. Leenhardt: Ibid., p. 243, who, although starting from another experience, arrives at the same conclusion.

It is part of the human function that is commonly designated by the term "understanding". It presupposes neither a specific mentality nor a strictly traditional social framework. As long as there are /363/ problems that knowledge will not solve, and there will always be such, myth will make its appearance beside them.

Examples abound. We find them in the dialogues of Plato, wherever Socrates, the analyst without equal, seeks to grasp entities inaccessible to the logos. (16)

16. P. M. Schuhl: La fabulation platonicienne, passim.

We find them in "technicized" societies where science and technology advance side by side with social, political, governmental, historical myths promising to render life paradisical, side by side with miraculous therapies, with astrologers and fortune-tellers, spiritualism and Christian Science.

The marriage of rational thinking and myth is characteristic of man and will disappear only with him.

The Sarakatsani, profiting both from rational thinking and mythical thinking, is, in the final analysis, simply obeying the make-up of the human mind.

EDUCATION

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The term "education" is taken here to mean communication and transmission of knowledge and of myth, the complement of knowledge. Now, as we know, it is direct and daily personal contact of youth with their elders (brothers, parents, grandparents) which ensures the transmission of knowledge during, and in connection with, common work, discussions, narratives, festivals, etc. (17)

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Fig. 109

The tziradi is a reduced flute, approximately 35 centimeters long. It is a portable instrument made of wood, metal or the long bones of the (237) eagle (fig. 109). In the latter case the bones must remain 40 days in a (783) church, before being used, for the birds of prey "are of the devil" and must therefore be purified. The tziradi has but seven holes, on one side only. The sound it produces is rather shrill.

Formerly, the Sarakatsani also used the bourboule, an instrument bought (178) commercially and consisting of two flutes joined. This instrument has today disappeared.

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/376/ PART FOUR

REMARKS ON THE WHOLE

121 After the partial aspects, an introduction to the whole of Sarakatsani society and culture: a step all the more necessary since, in the world of socio-cultural phenomena, the whole far exceeds the simple sum of its parts.

In this section we shall not concern ourselves with what is external and apparent only secondary. We intend above all to try to fathom the inner composition, to show how the parts are concretely integrated.

But if we succeed in defining the process that leads to the integration of the parts into the whole, that is to say, in bringing to light how we pass from plurality to unity, we shall, at the same time, be in a position to explain and to understand the whole. More than that.

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[12] It will be apparent that we shall explain the genesis of the components themselves.

It seems therefore that synthesis and explanation are on a par. They represent two aspects of a single procedure. That is the reason we shall consider them together.

This problem is not the only one that must be faced in this section. There is another at least as important: the formation of the whole necessarily involves the equilibrium of its components, an equilibuium which Sarakatsani society must maintain so as not to break up. It is therefore at the root of the problem of duration.

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CHAPTER I

AN ATTEMPT AT SYNTHESIS, EXPLANATION AND DEFINITION

SOME REFLECTIONS ON METHODOLOGY

The integration of the thousand facets of Sarakatsani society and culture into a whole immediately raises the problem of method.

In order to grasp the living reality which is a "whole," we must put a little "fluid" into our observations, as Mauss has already recommended. (1)

1. Reported by P. Metais: Problèmes de Sociologie Néo-Calédonienne, p. 47.

Which means that the way to follow is to put into dynamic correlation all the socio-cultural facts about out herders.

However, if we take for granted that the society in question is composed of a hundred components, if we take these elements as factors in the mathematical sense of the term, and if we wish to establish concretely all their possible combinations, direct or indirect, we see that the number of their reciprocal relations reaches a dizzy figure--100! factorial of 100.

The problem becomes complicated almost to infinity if we wish to move forward toward the relationships of these components with the various

/377 cont./

121 wholes they form, toward the relationships of the wholes among themselves, toward the relationships of elements and wholes with the entire society, and so on.

It is obvious that a method which wants to be "positive" and examine one by one this immense number of relationships is an impracticable method. We must therefore find another which will proceed by "abstractions."

/378/ The "types" assembled from any socio-cultural reality, representative of this reality and its parts, already constitute a solution, the effectiveness of which has been demonstrated by the works of Durkheim, M. Weber and especially G. Gurvitch.

However, though these qualitative and discontinuous "types" are very useful in the study of the process of integration of partial phenomena into various wholes and of these wholes into the entire society, they are not effective when we propose to go a little further and reach the man living in society. For they are concerned only with social phenomena and with their mutual multiple relationships, and take only incidentally into consideration the man who creates these phenomena and who, all during his life, is subject to their constraint. In an anthropological study like ours, synthesis must take place at the level of the human reality underlying the phenomena.

FUNDAMENTAL IDEAS OR PRINCIPLES GOVERNING SARAKATSANI LIFE.

Reality already comes to our aid. Viewing Sarakatsani society closely, we note that it seems to obey certain general principles, certain fundamental ideas which, to all appearances, are found at the basis of its creation, its peculiarities, its functioning, its regulation. These ideas are:

--Isolation and independence.

--Herding and nomadism.

121 /378 cont./

--Kinship and male preponderance.

--Cooperation and suppression of individualism.

--A communal life (solidarity--community).

--A cosmology and an anthropology based on beliefs concerning the Mother-Goddess.

--Orthodox Christianity interpreted according to previous beliefs.

But here several questions arise: 1st, Do these idea-principles really exist? Or are they a construction of our mind projected subsequently onto Sarakatsani life? 2nd, Do they govern forth above, hence capable of leading us to a solution of our problem?

From all evidence, only a close study of facts is capable /379/ of giving a satisfactory answer. Let us try therefore to put these ideas to the test of contact with reality.

IDEAS AND PHENOMENA. A CONFRONTATION.

We begin with a remark. If we wish to stick to reality and not indulge too much in abstract fragmentation, it is impossible to establish a single and unique correspondance, individualized and absolute, between an element and an idea, for the simple reason that each phenomenon is related to several ideas and that several ideas converge toward identical phenomena.

This polyvalence of phenomena and ideas is a consequence of the total character of socio-cultural phenomena; we shall therefore have to treat several elements and ideas at once--which makes it inconvenient for the economy of this text (one will often have the impression of going around in circles and repeating oneself), but also an advantage: shedding light on the organic ties existing between the parts.

182 596 Now, the confrontation of phenomena and ideas leads us to the following conclusions:

Herding, kinship, cooperation and community determine the adoption of the family group, the extended family as a form of group life. They raise

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182 789 755 to an understanding of the influences which come into play here and which at the same time are derived from all the fundamental ideas enumerated as these take on individual characteristics in concrete phenomena.

182 53 789 In conclusion, there remains for us to speak of Sarakatsani art, specifically insofar as this art is "incorporated," reproducing magico-religious symbols and providing the signs which keep the Sarakatsani in contact with the cultural treasures of his society. Its manifestations are therefore linked with the same ideas as the manifestations of magic--so that any further explanation is rendered unnecessary.

REPRESENTATIVENESS OF IDEAS. ABSTRACTIONS

121 Having completed the confrontation of ideas and phenomena, we may immediately draw from it a conclusion of fundamental importance: there is a correspondence between the ideas and the phenomena.

However, does this conclusion constitute a reply to the three questions that motivated the confrontation?

With regard to the first, and without going further, we /384/ can answer affirmatively: the fundamental ideas enumerated are not artificially constructed, but exist in reality. Their very correspondence with the phenomena proves it. If it were not so, the ideas would not be able to claim any reality for themselves.

But in order to reply to the other two questions, to know whether the ideas do or do not govern Sarakatsani life and whether they represent true abstractions, a specific task imposes itself. We must examine the correspondence in question, we must try to determine its content, its nature.

By observing anew the confrontation of ideas and phenomena we see that around isolation, herding and nomadism, kinship, male primacy, cooperation, community, conformity, cosmology and anthropology, finally religious syncretism, a great many phenomena converge. The ideas send

/384 cont./

121 their roots into the demographic and ecological foundation, the legal and moral systems, magic, religion, knowledge, myth, art.

We may even go further and say that though a typology based on the morphological characteristics of these elements of Sarakatsani life has enabled us to classify them in our various chapters, another classification is equally possible on the basis of the ideas in question.

The ideas therefore constitute a frame of reference different from the preceding, and the phenomena may be integrated within it.

But how to explain this phenomenon?

We shall tackle this problem at its foundation.

Each element of a socio-cultural order is created on the one hand in terms of man and the human environment it must serve, and on the other hand /in terms of/ the pertinent socio-cultural or natural conditions that obtain in the context in which this phenomenon unfolds. It is therefore charged with a meaning of a socio-cultural order, emanating from the dynamic of its context, and a human meaning based on its peculiar characteristics as a means of satisfying man's needs.

However, the elements are never isolated from each other. As constellations they combine in different dialectical processes and tend to form larger wholes. Similarly, their meanings, linked together dialectically, also form wholes which are simply over-all meanings /385/ of the meanings of the elements. Consequently, they are generalizations with respect to their components. Finally, they represent the meanings of the whole of corresponding phenomena and they proceed from the dialectic integration of socio-cultural and human meanings of the elements within the wholes.

When we speak of ideas of principles, we refer to these meanings of the wholes. They appear progressively as the phenomena and the totalities of phenomenon appear, spontaneously, by trial and error or deliberately,

/385 cont./

121 but always dialectically, under the pressure of and in relation to individual or collective needs, the possibilities momentarily offered and natural or existing socio-cultural conditions.

They are therefore anterior to the phenomena, not historically, but from the standpoint of logic and meaning.

It follows that once these ideas are created, they express the phenomena (considered as their meanings) and dominate them. They are the axes on which the phenomena develop, the end points toward which they are directed.

That is why we have accepted the ideas in question as fundamental and have labelled them principles.

Sociologically speaking, these ideas have a polyvalent character. They constitute models for the arrangement, the organization and the functioning of Sarakatsani society and its elements--general models, to be sure, which inspire others more individualized and more differentiated. They also represent norms of behavior for groups and individuals, as well as moral values. Finally, they are sources of inspiration for every solution of the vital problems of our herders and consequently for their cultural works.

However, though characterized as models, norms or values, the ideas in question do not merely signalize the "levels" of models, norms and values of Sarakatsani social reality, but they also exceed them considerably. The confrontation which we introduced demonstrated that the ideas reveal the total social phenomenon of our herders from various angles and maintain with it the relationships of signifier to signified.

It seems, therefore, that the ideas enumerated constitute very important points of reference, both socio-cultural and human /386/ since they presuppose both, and that, on the basis of this fact, they prove very revealing.

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121 Thus, and this is our final reply to the two questions for the sake of which we deferred this reply, the ideas proposed as models integrating and actuating the phenomena, govern and dominate Sarakatsani life. And in view of their nature as "signifiers" of the wholes of phenomena, when we speak of them we speak of phenomena. They are therefore representative of the phenomena and consequently true "abstractions."

APPRAISAL OF IDEAS AS MEANS OF SYNTHESIS AND EXPLANATION.

Henceforth we can proceed from these abstractions without going over the phenomena which they summarize, hence we may circumvent the difficulties that we came up against in the beginning.

In order to carry out the synthesis we shall work on this level, in other words, we shall follow the process of integration of ideas into the "whole."

At the same time, the elucidation of this process will show us how the "whole" is formed. And what are its constituent parts, and still on the level of the ideas.

Finally, these operations are carried out on the level of man, on the human level of the corresponding phenomena. For, as we have already emphasized the ideas in question represent not only the "utilitarian" aspect of the various elements (to serve the needs of men), but at the same time they reveal the way in which man, the Sarakatsani, conceives his life in society.

In fact, man does not participate mechanically, passively, in the life of his socio-cultural environment. He reflects on it, he tries to understand it, to accept it, to justify it, to control it. Even where these processes are not absolutely conscious or consciously and systematically expressed, they happen all the same. They manifest themselves in

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121 conversations, attitudes, judgments, minor occasions of daily life where one may catch them and be convinced of their existence.

The thoughts that emanate from these processes reflect the entire society. They represent it and interpret it in the spirit of the men --its members--and eventually they determine action and justify everything that becomes crystallized. They are not conceived /387/ theoretically, but in relation to the social context and the meaning of its elements. They are experienced at the same time that they are conceived. Finally, they are organized around certain pivotal ideas.

Now, these pivots are merely the fundamental ideas governing the phenomena, the meanings of the totalities of the elements. Though we have revealed these meanings on the level of facts, recognizing them as social phenomena, we discover them in man in the form of fundamental organizing principles of his social thinking. It is exactly this correspondence which enables us to pass from the sociological and the cultural to the human.

AN ATTEMPT AT SYNTHESIS AND EXPLANATION

The process of integrating ideas does not develop in the absolute. Like every other complex socio-cultural phenomenon it obeys, as we know, three dynamics:

1. The dynamism that each of the ideas exerts on the others and inversely.
2. The dynamic of fundamental concerns of the society in which this phenomenon develops.
3. Finally, the dynamic of objectively existing conditions.

In order to arrive at a synthesis, we must therefore correlate these three categories of elements--ideas, concerns, conditions. But first let us turn to the last two.

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182 --The fundamental concerns of the Sarakatsani are: to live, first of all, and then to survive materially, socially, culturally and ethnically.

--The objective conditions of their life include: climate, the earth (nature and topography), the fauna and flora, isolation from surrounding society, finally the Greco-Christian tradition, to which [illegible] affiliations.

182 Now, the correlation of all these elements shows that:

[181] --The independence which explains the Sarakatsani's penchant for liberty has led him to abandon his sedentary home in order to avoid slavery. At the same time it has separated him from Hellenic society [177] (and from its fortunes) and the relations he maintains with it are reduced to a strict minimum. It has therefore imposed on him /388/ isolation raised to the level of one of the fundamental conditions of his life.

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233 --Sheep herding, as the means of acquiring economic goods, represents the only solution that permits him to meet material needs, considering the peculiarities of the climatic and natural environment and the isolation. The latter forces an economy of self-sufficient subsistence that can be realized only by herding. Furthermore, herding, for the same reasons, imposes nomadism.

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596 --Kinship and the preponderance of men over women, which assumes concrete form chiefly in the quasi-patriarchal extended family, constitute a response to numerous problems. To isolation, first of all, which favors the formation of the extended family, while the family, in turn, guarantees isolation. For the extended family ensures security and the possibility of not mingling with the "others" and consequently safeguarding

/389 cont./ The myths
182 permit the Sarakatsani to place themselves in relation to the world
773 and /390/ within the world and to develop a curative magic protective
[789] of men, animals and life. If Sarakatsani knowledge has scarcely
developed it is because the conditions of their life does not permit it.
[171] And it is the Greek cultural tradition which intervenes and gives the Sarakatsani the myths in question. Moreover, these myths are alive almost everywhere, in numerous spheres of Greek society.

182 --Finally, their religion, made up of a syncretism between
771 Christianity and the mythology of the Mother-Goddess and differing from the official religion, owes its existence to the fact that the latter is not concerned with problems of curing. Sarakatsani knowledge has no solution to these so, the way is open to the introduction of a syncretism that is favored, moreover, by tradition.

182 This brief confrontation having been made, we should like to make
121 a comment the principal ideas governing Sarakatsani life are extremely coherent when we examine them all together. They support one another and form a harmonious whole. More than that. It is impossible to conceive of any of them without at the same time taking into account all the others.

Likewise, one cannot imagine the ideas without the conditions, the conditions without the concerns, the concerns without the conditions and inversely.

Ideas, conditions, concerns are intimately, even dialectically linked together.

It is exactly through this deep interrelationship of all the categories of elements in question that a synthesis is realized. Everything converges toward everything, constituting a solid chain each link of which, inextricably bound to all the others, involves concerns,

/390 cont./

182 conditions and ideas and, of course, all that each of them in turn
121 represents of underlying phenomena.

121 The final synthesis that we sought from the beginning is just this moving, living, dynamic and supremely significant chain.

Although conceived on the level of the individual and the fundamental social ideas of the Sarakatsani, it does not reduce the social reality to the cognitive or the "cultural," but corresponds to the total social phenomenon. It is true to the following discerning remark by G. Gurvitch that: "Society is within us and we are in /391/ society," and, what is more, to the very principles of anthropology.

Lastly, in a final image, this chain evokes the over-all configuration of Sarakatsani society and culture, the parts of which we have presented somewhat like a mosaic in the preceding chapters, and which we now restore to its inner unity by casting a little light on its articulations.

We shall wait to define this configuration in what follows.

As for the explanation, we believe that the picture of the correlation of ideas, conditions and concerns is so eloquent that specific comments are unnecessary. Of course, this applies to the explanation of the "whole." But there is more.

The same picture explains the formation of its parts, of the principle links of the chain, namely, how the fundamental ideas were adopted, how social man decided in favor of them, forced by certain conditions. However, in this connection it is essential to be specific.

When we speak of fundamental concerns which are transformed into motivations for action and into needs felt by the Sarakatsani, and of natural objective conditions, we consider neither the one nor the other as outside the Sarakatsani social framework properly speaking. Thanks to

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121 their reciprocal relations which we revealed above in their concrete form, concerns and conditions acquire a social significance; they are transformed under the influence of the Sarakatsani collective consciousness and they become social phenomena like all the others. As a result, we may legitimately include them in our explanatory reasoning, while remaining faithful to Durkheim is rule that the social is explained only by the social.

Thus we do not reduce the sociological explanation to a psychological and biological explanation, repeating the exaggerations of functionalism which have been so widely criticized. (3)

3. For a general examination of this problem see:
A. Devyver: Presentation des Argonautes de Malinowski, p. 18 f.

nor do we reduce it to a geographical explanation, the monism and inadequacy of which have likewise been condemned.

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/392/ In order to complete our observations on the "whole," its composition and its explanation, we must take into account another of its aspects.

Certain ideas exert a most important influence on others. Examining them from this point of view we find that independence, kinship and male primacy, as well as herding are more prominent than community, cooperation, cosmology, religion. And among the first it is kinship that predominates. It makes independence and herding possible, it polarizes cooperation and community and it inspires the subject matter of magic and religion.

It is the same with concerns and conditions. Among concerns it is socio-cultural and ethnic survival that influences in a decisive way the resolving ideas. (4)

/392 cont./

121 4. The justification of this statement is the subject matter of the following chapter.

And among conditions it is the specific geographical environment which plays the same role.

Of course, these privileged influences, so to speak, cannot be raised to the rank of a unilateral determinism, of a unilinear causality exerted over the rest. The "whole," let us repeat, is created from dialectical connections that develop simultaneously on all sides.

On the other hand, the influences in question, constituting salient points in the framework of Sarakatsani life, give the latter its peculiar character, in other words, its style.

AN ATTEMPT AT A DEFINITION

We now have all the indispensable data to try to define the style in which the general configuration of Sarakatsani society and culture is expressed.

105 182 596 [494] [233] Sarakatsani life unfolds within the framework of the extended, patrilocal and quasi-patriarchal family and in associations of families, the Tséligatos. Placed under the authority of a head, its omni-functional and strictly regulated and organized units develop a self-sufficient economic activity based on a symbiosis with the animals (nomadic herding [829] of small livestock). Relying on themselves, the Sarakatsani mistrust the [476] outside and follow a communal regime of internal cooperation. With [771] strict, very traditional customs they conceive of the world /393/ through beliefs arising from the myth of the mother-goddess, but at the same time they practice orthodox Christianity. Their culture, though [181] unique from several points of view, belongs basically to the Mediterranean [713] culture area.

121 182 However, this descriptive definition includes two points on which it

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121 182 is advisable to give some details in order to avoid misunderstandings that might alter the picture.

121 182 233 The symbiosis of the Sarakatsani with their animals does not imply a parasitic solution--that of living on the animal and the animal on nature, spontaneous growth--as might offhand be believed, especially under the influence of certain authors trying to draw up a general theory of pastoral nomadism. (5)

(113) 5. See Lawrence Krader: "Ecologie du nomadisme pastoral", in: Revue Intern. des Sciences sociales U.N.E.S.C.O., Vol. XI, no. 4, 1959, p. 521.--J. Berque: Introduction to the same number of the same periodical.

On the contrary. Using an excellent formula by A. Toynbee in connection with the same problem (general, but applicable to the case of the Sarakatsani), we find that between them and their stock there is "...a fair exchange of benefits. If the flocks are kept to give their milk and meat to man, the latter must provide subsistence for the animals. Neither the one nor the other...can exist...without reciprocal help." (6)

6. See A. Toynbee: Histoire, p. 194.

121 181 171 The second point refers to the characterization of the Sarakatsani culture as Mediterranean. In the preceding chapters we have had occasion to emphasize repeatedly this characteristic of the cultural works of these nomads, beginning with their technology and ending with their cosmology and their religion. If we return to it, that is because the origins of the ideas of cooperation and its forms in the Balkans have been the subject of the liveliest discussions among historians. Some of them maintain that this is a practice of Slavic inspiration. If this assertion is true and if we consider the extremely important place that cooperation occupies in the lives of these herders, it would seem that the designation of their culture as exculsively Mediterranean is erroneous.

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Now, the culture in question belongs indubitably to the cultural area, in the meaning given this term by Mauss, of the eastern basin of the Mediterranean, and more precisely still, of the European Southeast. All the aspects examined testify to this. Technology /394/ and crafts, ideas governing family life, the system of socio-economic organization, magic, cosmology, anthropology, finally religion are deeply impregnated with the ideological universe established in this region of the world for centuries. Sarakatsani culture embraces elements, laid down in successive and super imposed layers, derived from all the civilizations that have appeared here from remotest antiquity. The preceding chapters having sufficiently shown the temporal dimension of this culture, we shall not speak of it again. We shall merely round out our previous remarks by a few words about the principle of cooperation and its forms among our nomads because of the lively discussion that this principle has called forth among certain historians.

Now, the idea of family cooperation was very soon put into practice among the populations of the Hellenic Peninsula. Life within the framework of the Greek genos, of which we have spoken before, is based on this same idea, despite its own peculiarities. We find it again in a later epoch, during the Hellenic middle ages where it is reflected in the nomos georgikas, the agrarian law of the Byzantine Emperor Justinian II (685-697; 705-711 A.D.), according to which "the inhabitants of the village appear at the same time to be joined together in a community; moreover, unlike the tilled fields, the orchards and the kitchen gardens which are the personal property of individuals, the pastures, the woods as well as all the other uncultivated land are the common property of the village. The village community is considered by the authorities as an administrative and fiscal unit, as a taxable unit..." (7)

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7. G. Ostrogorsky: Histoire de l'État byzantin, French translation, p. 120, footnote 1.

It is precisely this village community which has given rise to the most lively controversies about its origins. For it has been interpreted by certain historians such as Zacharia, Vasiliev, Kij and Ouspenskij as an organization inspired by the Russian mir. On this particular point G. Ostrogorsky, the historian from whom we borrowed the preceding quotation, says distinctly, while criticizing the works of the authors mentioned, that the mir is late phenomenon; and he adds: "...a communal regime such as this, characterized by the community of fields, never existed in Byzantium, and if one wants to stick to the sources, one must agree that no community of this kind among the ancient /395/ Slavs is known; on the other hand, Byzantium and other countries and peoples along with it were acquainted, well before the Slavic invasion, of a community in the sense we spoke of above." (8)

8. See O. Ostrogorsky: op. cit., p. 165, footnote 5, the entire criticism with copious bibliographic references. See also R. Thurwaldt: l'Economie primitive, p. 345. "We know, moreover, that the family community of the southern Slavs was a relatively recent creation without deep roots in the past." This author cites as corroboration F. Kraus: Sitte und Brauch der Sud-Slaven, p. 64, and J.S. Lewinski: The Origin of Property, Etc.

Of course, these testimonies concern only the lives of free and sedentary peasants. About the pastoral life, to repeat, we know nothing. 171 233 However, ethnographic observation shows that in the Balkans nomadic herding was practiced chiefly by the Aroumain (Valaque), the Albanians (Arvanito-Valaque) and the Sarakatsani. The Bulgars and the Turks were ignorant of it, or almost so. And among the Yogoslavs it seems that in

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171 Sarakatsani culture as South European is not contradicted by any of its
181 elements. And finally, if we have qualified it as Mediterranean and not simply as Greek, it is because the folk cultures still existing in Greece, and there are several, belong to a common base that could be called Mediterranean civilization, created in the course of time by cultural exchanges among shore-dwelling peasants, without loss of their original national character.

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CHAPTER II

THE PROBLEM OF EQUILIBRIUM AND DURATION

Decline and its Causes

121 The concern of the Sarakatsani to survive socially, culturally and
182 ethnically, their concern about their continuance becomes a problem of the equilibrium of their socio-cultural universe. We have already said that as long as the latter is able to keep its elements firmly together, continuance is assured. But any breakdown of the equilibrium means splitting and dissolution.

The fact that the Sarakatsani have been able to safeguard their way of life over centuries shows that they have found a solution. Some of our previous analyses enable us to glimpse it. But we must try to describe it in detail in order to reveal the mechanism it presupposes.

* * * *

121 In order to respond concretely to the requirements of this new problem it seems to us practical to reverse the wording of it: what are the elements of Sarakatsani life that "threaten" its equilibrium? How does this threat manifest itself? And what are the means employed to neutralize it?

Let us speak first of their group life, beginning with the family the most important group known to our herders.

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578 It is possible that conjugal families or small lineages will one day find themselves in competition or in conflict with each other or with the extended family of which they are a part or with both at the same time.

The many causes of competition may be classified into two categories:

Occasional causes reflecting conflicts /398/ arising from a specific combination of circumstances, as for example, personal discord between heads or other members of the sub-groups of the family unit (dislikes, jealousies, disputes, rancor, hatred, etc.), disagreements about the managament or because of the managament of the common enterprise, ambitions of a sub-group's head who aspires to become an independent head, etc.

578 627 182 The means at the disposal of Sarakatsani society to cope with this are both manifold and effective: in case of discord or personal ambitions, the individuals concerned may demand their "share" of the common goods and leave, or else join another Tséligato. Likewise, economic disagreements may be solved either by arbitration or by the dismissal of an incapable head-manager, or finally by splitting up and dispersing. At worst, the original family group may find itself lessened in strength or even split up. But in general the means of bypassing differences, true safety values, channel the pressures in directions provided for, and avoid a challenge to the adopted way of life, as would be the case if the explosive situations did not have another outlet.

578 Causes inherent in the very system of Sarakatsani life, reflecting social conflicts that derive from its inherent characteristics. It is chiefly this second category of rivalries which, as constant dangers to the equilibrium, merit our attention.

[121] As a matter of fact, according to a correct but very much disputed formula by C. Lévi-Strauss, "no society is perfect. Each one has by

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578 nature an impurity that is incompatible with the norms it proclaims
121 and that expresses itself concretely in a certain amount of injustice, insensitivity, cruelty..." (1)

1. C. Lévi-Strauss: Tristes Tropiques /Sad Tropics/, p. 417.

578 This assertion, equally valid for Sarakatsani society, opens the way
571 to the study of its imperfections, that is, the asymmetries of social relations which are peculiar to it and which arise from the total social phenomenon and from its structure. These asymmetries ceaselessly threaten the structure.

Now, in studying the internal hierarchy of the family group we see that the subjugation of small lineages and conjugal families to the extended family, of junior age groups /399/ to the senior ones, women to men, families of participants in the Tséligato and the participants themselves to the Tséligas and to his family carries with it the potential germs of revolt. If the revolt becomes reality it will completely change the life of our herders.

578 However, such a development seems excluded and this thanks to the dynamics of many factors.

578 The first of these factors is indisputably the socially guided
182 preparation of the Sarakatsani as individuals to accept in advance the
155 norms governing the subjugation and the hierarchization, with everything
626 oppressive and unjust that they include. The preparation in question
183 presupposes a molding of character and the implanting in the collective, as well as the individual, mentality of a certain number of ideas, notions, and principles in terms of which individuals and groups are made to see their lives, or, not to be able to imagine a different life - which amounts to the same thing.

183 /399 cont./

578 In the second place, there is constraint in the general sense of
182 the term. It appears first in the influence of the Tséligas, the head,
626 who, to the extent that he has a strong personality and a true capacity
[474] to govern, is in a position to impose on his subjects the traditional
[554] norms by which the family group functions and thus to safeguard its cohesion and its content /sic: "son conteny"/. Constraint manifests
[671] itself next in law and morality, the two aspects of group constraint
[577] which, armed with social support, act sovereignly in favor of the socio-cultural status quo. The analysis of the way they are enforced has demonstrated their effectiveness.

578 In the third place are the idealization and mythization of the
182 "Sarakatsani condition," the elevation to the rank of supreme value and
183 myth every cultural solution to each specific problem. No matter that the application of these solutions, coldly considered, entails privations, concessions, and demands abnegation or sacrifice! In psychoanalytic terms, one might call this phenomenon sublimation.

578 Religion for its part, with its teaching and traditions that
791 prescribe obedience to headmen, to elders, and justify the subordination
183 of the woman, while sanctioning the traditions by salvation, also supports
182 the social edifice by determining behavior and its motivation, that is to say, by determining collective attitudes.

578 Finally, we encounter the mechanism of "obligation-compensation"
675 /400/ of which we have spoken above, (2)

182 2. See above, p. 205-206, etc.

and to which we should like to add some details--first of all terminologically. The notion of alienation is taken here in its primitive and
● [121] legal meaning (Lalande) according to which alienatus is not free. Thus, it is not identical with mental alienation or with alienation according

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578 675 182 121 to the Marxist theory, (3)

3. On the different meanings of the term alienation in Marx see: G. Gurvitch: La vocation, vol, II, pp. 253-258. although these have their origin in it. We use this term to indicate every case in which groups and individuals yield to other groups or other individuals all or part of their social or economic independence, their initiative, their activity, consciously or unconsciously, in the hope of obtaining in return a profit, a privilege, the recognition of certain rights, or more generally, some sort of satisfaction. [Eds. 128 note: since this meaning of the word "alienation" would not be immediately apparent to readers of parts of the text in English in the Files, the term has been translated where used as "obligation"].

578 675 182 121 The term "compensation" designates exactly this counter-benefit and distinguishes it clearly from purely psychological compensation or psychoanalytic sublimation. Let us add further that compensation may be real, ideological or presumed, present or anticipated. It is not necessary that there be an absolute equivalence between the two terms. A relative equivalence suffices for this mechanism to bear fruit. Observation of societies shows that individuals and groups are mutually bound by manifold contributions of the obligation-compensation type which, in the final analysis, makes possible, up to a certain point, life in society. Of course, the nature, content, number, etc., of relations of this kind varies with the types of partial or whole societies and their structures. And if one wishes to analyze them, one will find that they reflect society as a whole, while being linked specifically with models, statuses, social roles, collective attitudes, ideas, values and mentalities. However, it would be erronous to believe that the relationship "obligation-compensation" is a contractual relationship. It could be, but is not always, or rather is so

578 /400 cont./
675 only in limited cases. Finally, it is certain that all relationships
182 of domination would degenerate into simple pressure relations (4)
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4. On this distinction see G. Gurvitch: La Vocation, Vol. I, p. 222.

which in their turn would become situations of conflict if the mechanism "obligation-compensation" would not intervene to /401/ ensure at least a precarious equilibrium, provided that the total social phenomenon and social structure favor it.

578 In the case of the Sarakatsani, the mechanism in question enables
675 individuals and groups not to consider their subordination as slavery
182 pure and simple. For the principles of organization of their social life
183 are oriented toward a strong integration of all elements, individuals or
121 groups in a system where the maximum of socio-economic security is accorded to all. A sort of blueprint or secular and "primitive" control which determines each person's place in advance, permits him to benefit from a maximum of foresight. The main ideas that dominates Sarakatsani social organization and emanates from the value, of community is to ensure the destiny of each of its members. This represents the chief compensation of any subjugation, and we can now evaluate it according to its true nature. Moreover, the prerogatives of each person (man, woman, headman, participants), be they administrative, family, religious or magical prerogatives, neutralize the possible feelings of frustration which otherwise could make their appearance and be extremely virulent and disintegrating.

In short, the role of the "obligation-compensation" mechanism on behalf of equilibrium and a lack of schism proves fundamental. This is so obvious that it seems to us unnecessary to emphasize it. This mechanism provides not only the justification for the asymmetries in Sarakatsani

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society the "injustices and incompatibilities between norms and their realization." according to the formula of Lévi-Strauss, but also the means of overcoming them, and that in a constructive way.

As for the threats against the equilibrium arising from social units other than the family, we should like to emphasize that they are minor. The hostility of Sarakatsani society toward non-conformists exerts sufficient constraint to intimidate those who might possible violate the adopted socio-cultural models, this constraint consolidates both these models and the social equilibrium. Furthermore, since surrounding society is indifferent to the Sarakatsani who themselves insist on preserving their isolation, and does not interfere with their lives, it does not upset the equilibrium nor endanger its continuance. Or rather, that is what went on up to the last decades / "decennies?"/

* * * *

/402/ Nevertheless, other threats arise from one-dimensional elements of Sarakatsani society, and present the possibility of changing the latter.

In fact, if the technology or crafts, the organization of the family and the Tséligato, the economic system, law and morality, knowledge, magic or religion changed, they would bring about changes capable of loosening the general structure from top to bottom, given the close dialectical bonds existing between them.

However, this possibility is slight, for several reasons. First of all, because the change of one of these elements would encounter the resistance of all the others, precisely because of the dialectical link. In the second place, because all these elements are cultural solutions to concrete problems and their effectiveness has been demonstrated by experience. No one would agree to modify them in favor of a non-proven

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S 121 178 182 solution and a possibly disastrous one. Finally, chiefly because all these solutions, as we have already shown, have been applied in terms of the objective conditions of Sarakatsani life. And since these conditions have remained the same throughout time, the solutions too have spanned centuries and their equilibrium has remained unaltered.

S 121 178 Finally, using Gurvitch's terminology the centripetal forces always prevail over the centrifugal forces. The mechanism of neutralization or threats that we have just analyzed is so strong that no change emanating either from grouped or one-dimensional elements is possible from "within."

S [177] If in our day we see a change happening, it is from the exterior that it arises, from the modification that factors alien to the Sarakatsani world inflict on certain elements "within"--very important points of support of the mechanism in question.

S 121 177 178 It would be very important from various points of view to define the process of change, the causes that have provoked it, the different levels on which it is manifested. We should do so first, in order to corroborate the assertion that the change comes from the outside; then, in order to demonstrate our statements on the decisive influence of certain aspects of Sarakatsani life upon its /403/ creation, its style and its stability; finally, in order to explain the change, we shall now bring out the events that have contributed to it.

S 175 179 121 G 175 548 922 Gradual liberation of the country.

It was completed in 1920. Surrounding society is no longer dominated by the foreigner and as a result of this fact it ceases to be hostile. It no longer threatens the independence of the Sarakatsani.

Emigration of Greeks from Asia Minor.

In 1922 the Greek army evacuated Asia Minor. The Greeks of that

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region, numbering 1,200,000, fled from the atrocities of the Turkish army, left their homes and settled in Greece. Within the context of the measures taken to facilitate their repatriation, the Hellenic government decided upon the expropriation of large landed properties and the distribution of unoccupied land among the refugees. Pastures were thus given over to agriculture and herding was deprived of the means of feeding large flocks. A certain number of Tséligatos were thus made to disappear.

The last World War and the political evolution of the Balkans.

The Tséligatos that survived the parcelling out of pastureland found as a solution the leasing of pastures in Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. But this solution proved impracticable during the second world war and especially after the erection of the "iron curtain." This was the death blow for them. From then on large-scale nomadic sheep herding started to decline very rapidly. At the present writing the number of Tséligatos having "3000 head" of sheep cannot be more than 20 for all of Greece. The participants of the dissolved Tséligatos have been obliged to seek individual solutions.

The administrative reorganization of the Hellenic State.

In 1938 the Government passed a law requiring all nomads of the country who had not done so until then, to be listed in the civil registers of the various municipalities. This measure had several consequences:

a) Subject to compulsory military service, the Sarakatsani came into contact with models and values other /404/ than theirs and, willy-nilly became impregnated with them. You saw Sarakatsani become technicians or car drivers, etc. The illiterates were given rudimentary education in schools for army illiterates. And everybody became acquainted with big

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(114)

5. We may be criticized, and rightly so, for having silently passed over another decisive factor of change in the Sarakatsani type of life. This is "acculturation." We should like to explain that our silence in this matter is due to the fact that we have for several years been preparing a special study on this problem, which will soon appear.

Hence a dramatic struggle of these strained elements toward the quest for a new formula.

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CONCLUSION

Homo Saracatsanus

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To know the Sarakatsani in his totality and on the basis of his socio-cultural works, this has been the objective we set ourselves in presenting this work. An ambitious goal, to be sure (more especially since the existing scientific means permit only approximations which rest on modest contributions), but a natural result of this anthropological study.

We shall now try to draw the profile of the Sarakatsani, the picture of the man who created the socio-cultural reality that we have analyzed and who, in turn, has been created by his own creations. In order to do this we shall turn to what is original and distinctive in him. This picture we have called homo saracatsanus, even though current terminology designates with similar words entire species and not simply variants. May we be pardoned for the heresy in the name of the evocative power of the formula.

We shall not go back to the works of the Sarakatsani in order not to repeat ourselves. We shall consider this dimension of our present problem as known. We shall proceed from another dimension which we shall call "Sarakatsani Anthropology" and which we can circumscribe in a formula that will at the same time outline the plan of our account.

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121 Every society, and therefore the society of our herders, has an anthropology of its own, a collective work and consequently a social phenomenon which, though not entirely conscious, nevertheless exists. It is expressed in anthropological ideas, in the strict sense, in the socio-cultural molding of individuals, in the socially accepted latitude that permits a man to develop his initiative, in the organization, in the broad sense, of social life conceived as an instrument from which the individual will benefit, finally in the content and extent of the value that man represents for it.

/408/ We believe that these points will suffice for us to accomplish our task. And we hope that knowledge of the action will enable us, in addition, to lift the mask behind which the face of the actor is hidden.

* * * *

121 812 791 (761) (795) Sarakatsani anthropological ideas are familiar to us. Man, like the grain, grows, blossoms, begets descendants and dies. Born from the earth, he returns to the earth from whence spring powerful creative forces so that a new life may see the light. Death is for him a natural phenomenon that must be faced with courage. But he believes in the life hereafter described by Christianity, in which the soul may enjoy eternal rest if his life has conformed to the Christian prescription and if, in addition, the living faithfully follow on his behalf both Christian and pre-Christian funeral customs and usages. All these ideas also bear profound traces of a religious syncretism which we need not discuss again.

Man is not completely defenseless before nature and the supernatural. Aside from technology, he is acquainted with ways of exerting his influence on them so that both will consent to favor to him. Nevertheless, man trembles before nature and the supernatural because of his weakness, without however sinking into despair, discouragement or inaction. On the contrary,

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121 812 771 he must show himself courageous and make use of all procedures likely to incline these forces in the desired direction. A dramatic colloquy, but full of nobility and human dignity.

121 812 829 462 However, man must mold himself to the requirements of his environment. A profound dichotomy thereupon enters into the criteria for molding--a dichotomy based on sex. The men, on the one hand, and the women, on the other, must each develop certain skills, aptitudes, virtues knowledge and beliefs chosen from "the arc of possible behavior." (1)

1. According to the formula of R. Benedict: Echantillons de civilisations, p. 281.--

See also M. Mead: Moeurs et sexualité, p. 268.

121 829 462 /409/ The following table gives us a concise idea of them:

TABLE

Faculties to be developed	Men	Women
Technical skills.....	Herding, wood crafts,	Building, weaving, housework.
Economic & administrative skills.....	Productions, trade, management of family property, spirit of cooperation, patriarchal type of command, righteousness.	Consumption, spirit of cooperation, obedience control of girls.
Virtues.....	Pride, independence, communal spirit, conformism, traditionalism. Sobriety, austerity. Good family fathers. Warriors.	the same. In addition: chastity, absolute submission to the men. Good mothers of family.
Magico-religious aptitudes.....	Very limited, relating to certain rites as shepherds or males (sexual content of rite)	Almost exclusive protagonists of the magico-religious ritual.

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Faculties to be developed	Men	Women
Knowledge	Techniques related to male work. Rudiments of letters.	Techniques reserved to women. Illiterate.
Beliefs	Traditional mythology (mother-goddess). Orthodox Christianity.	The same.
Aesthetic aptitudes	Storytellers, singers, dancers. Wood sculptors. Flute players.	The same. Embroidery.

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/410/ This table enables us to draw several conclusions.

The choice made by Sarakatsani society among the possible aspects of human behavior, thereafter presented to its members in the form of models of capacities to be acquired, etc., is made in terms of the fundamental ideas or principles ruling its life. A comparison between them and the preceding table suffices to provide an illustration.

The concrete content of each skill, each aptitude, etc., corresponds absolutely to the various categories of socio-cultural works of the Sarakatsani, on all levels of their social life.

The result is that their total social phenomenon is reflected wholly in their psyche. Given, on the one hand, the strong integration of the (182) Sarakatsani in their society and, on the other hand, the direct and in- (626) tense social control of individuals, it is clear that their social world is deeply engraved in them.

We thus come to another question: Do the Sarakatsani have the opportunity to develop capacities, virtues, faculties, etc., other than those which have been offered by their society? The study of their (829) morality and above all their mechanism of dividing people into categories of "honored, not honored and dishonored," on the one hand, and their criteria for appreciating the artist, on the other hand, are very revealing.

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12 18 They show that the latitude offered the Sarakatsani to give free rein to their originality, namely to their temperament, their talents, their imagination, is not very great. The latitude is provided in advance and obeys predictable models. This formula does not mean that our herders are automatons whose strings are pulled by their society and their culture, but merely that they are not supposed to go beyond certain norms. The fact that they are honored when they distinguish themselves in accomplishing certain tasks perfectly shows that Sarakatsani society knows how to appreciate talent and originality. However, it does not permit the non-observance of the "prescribed." 12 18 22

This means that the Sarakatsani become "typical" individuals. (2)

2. See M. Mead's distinction between "typical" and "atypical": Ibid., p. 268.

Those who are atypical are not tolerated. They are, in fact threatened with social banishment. Sarakatsani social molding is 12 18 therefore total. And, to express this statement on another level, we might say that among them traditional cultural works /411/ flow into their psyches; in other words, their total social and psychological phenomena overlap almost completely. (3)

3. Inspired by G. Gurvitch.

Nevertheless, Sarakatsani society is interested not only in the molding of its members, but also in their destiny. It provides for them socially, it puts at their disposal its organization and its means. All the solutions of their vital problems that it has adopted converge toward "a primitive, socio-economic planning," according to a formula by Radin, (4)

4. See P. Radin: Le monde de l'homme primitif, pp. 99 and 201.

/411 cont./

121 181 [554] which ultimately insures the life of all. In Sarakatsani society no one is disinherited. From the time of each person's birth he has a socio-economic status, determined in advance, a means of subsistence, a guarantee on his property, assistance in case of misfortune, solidarity and support of the group in case of danger. Socio-economic differences exists, to be sure. But no one is left destitue. In case of overwhelming circumstances, the mechanism of solidarity swings into action so that the victim will be aided.

121 181 156 Of course, individuals are not taken into consideration as such. The Sarakatsani do not preach the cult of individualism. Individuals are perceived in the foresight and functionalism of their society, solely as cells of the latter and above all as members of the family group. This formula does not mean that the value "man" has no meaning among the Sarakatsani, nor that the predominance of the collectivity acts to obliterate individuals. The Sarakatsani as Greeks and Christians are sufficiently prepared to have the individual figure in the totality of their ideas. However, in all cases, and they are numerous, where their society must make a choice between the individual interest and that of the group, it will prefer the group.

This choice should not surprise us. It is the consequence of the way in which the Sarakatsani conceives of himself as a social being, and conceives of his relations with another, that others, and in short, his society. And this conception is based on kinship, cooperation, the community, raised to the rank of supreme values.

* * * *

181 /412/If one has occasion to see Sarakatsani walking in a provincial city one is struck by their bearing, their pride, their nobility. At that moment a comparison with peasants of the plains and with townpeople is

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181 clearly to their advantage. The Sarakatsani "is not afraid to look straight into the sun." Between him and the universe there is no impassable abyss. For he feels capable of making a bridge across the void of creating what to the peasants and townspeople seems impossible, without compromising and without bending their backs. And how could it be otherwise? The mountain is a school of virility and up there there is room only for men who know how to struggle against nature, against their neighbor, against themselves. A great school, which brings to Greece human patterns of an exceptional quality, for the Sarakatsani and more generally all highlanders, have heroically defended its liberty and preserved its immense resources by renewal and creation.

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198 At the moment we write these lines the Sarakatsani are abandoning more and more rapidly the elements of their cultural uniqueness. In a few years there will be nothing left of it. A mixed economy, agriculture and sedentary or transhumant herding, has replaced the old system. The children go to school regularly and aspire to various careers. A small test we asked some Sarakatsani school children to take showed that the boys dreamed of the braid of an officer or a pilot, of a merchant's cash, of the salary of a specialized technician, while the girls longed for a sewing machine or a knitting machine, for the teacher's profession, for a realm certainly modest but how significant, to be mistress of a house.

121 198 Faced with this change, we cannot help asking ourselves how we feel about it.

From the "humanitarian" point of view it is no doubt permissible. The Sarakatsani must have his place within the framework of the general change and of the present effort to raise the standard of living of all the peoples of the globe. He too must commence to live like a "civilized"

/412 cont./

178 human being.

121 Nevertheless, the means at the disposal of contemporary man by our urbanized and technicized civilization for /413/ an improvemnt of his condition also bear bitter fruits. The price of comfort and well-being is too often agony, insecurity, dehumanization of work, constant dissatisfaction, the rupture of ties between men, solitude, social injustice.

When one considers slums and shanty towns, when one consults the statistics dealing with certain diseases (neurosis and psychosis), prostitution or criminality, in countries in the process of rapid development, the picture takes on a disquieting glare.

Then, comparisons become inevitable. We are surely not advocates of the myth of the "noble savage" nor of maxims recommending "the return to nature." And we have no illusions about the condition of the Sarakatsani. However, one fact is certain: among them the phenomena of social pathology are unknown.

Thus, change among our herders, rapid and without any preparation that could lessen the brutality of the shock, fills us with great disquiet.

However, it is quite necessary to recognize and perhaps accept it: progress presupposes "human cost." "History," once the threshold of "tradition" is crossed, flounders but advances on muddy ground, drenched with sweat and, in some cases, with the blood of "human beings," the heirs of Prometheus.

/pp. 415-424 of foreign text not translated/